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ABSTRACT
The recent challenges imposed by the highly competitive global automotive industry have led Ford Motor
Company to search for improved product quality, performance and lower costs by leveraging the
capabilities offered in developing countries such as Mexico. As demand for automotive engineering
services in this country increase rapidly, the interest behind this work is to create a systems-oriented
framework applied to the planning, execution and improving phases of the relatively inexperienced
Product Development Organization in Mexico, to help achieve what they have defined as success.
To develop this framework, first, a systems decomposition approach was applied to a real organizational
failure case to evidence the importance of defining the basic inputs of a product development system and
its connections during the planning phase, and the optimal type of organization that should execute to
achieve its strategic objectives. Second, for the execution phase, two cases were evaluated under a system
dynamics approach to illustrate the effect of an inexperienced workforce on the overall productivity of the
organization, and a mitigation strategy based on a mentoring and training policy when the only constant is
change. Third, for the improving phase, a system dynamics approach was also used to illustrate the
importance of embracing the learning capabilities of the organization to improve it execution.
The key outcome is a systems-oriented framework to guide an inexperienced manager to achieve success
considering the following: Planning the inputs of an organization and maintaining a lightweigh structure
approach will enhance high levels of execution responsiveness and quality at reduced costs. Mentoring
and training policies while maintaining flexibility, agility and adaptability are key enablers to achieve a
low cost execution responsiveness and quality in an inexperienced organization, but such policies reduce
its productivity during the initial stages of the policy implementation. Finally, successful organizations
are those that work harder to solve urgent issues now, and work smarter to increases its capabilities in the
long run improving execution cost, quality and responsiveness.
Thesis Supervisor: Anjali Sastry
Title: Senior Lecturer, Sloan School of Management
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Chapter 0: Introduction
0.1) Background: Automotive Enterprise Landscape
The auto industry in the 19th century became one of the engines of the industrial revolution with Ford
Motor Company as one of the leaders. Yesterday's market leaders, specially the so called "big 3" (Ford,
Chrysler, General Motors), are struggling to survive in a market that has shifted from simply purchasing
products (cars), to a demand generator for quality, high performance and low cost products and services.
In today's competitive automotive market, only the companies capable of providing a new value
proposition for their final customers can survive.
Two decades ago the automotive industry in North America started to suffer a transformation. Foreign
automakers' product execution dramatically improved and American companies' product performance
and quality were severely challenged. As a result of increasing competitiveness, customer preferences
shifted towards buying foreign automaker brands, which translated into a decrease in sales and market
share for the Big Three American Automakers. Towards the end of the 2 0 th century, American
automakers realized that they were not delivering the products that their customers wanted and needed.
This and the large gap in the quality of their vehicles in comparison with the quality of vehicles from
foreign automakers were significant contributors to their loss of competitiveness.
These challenges forced Ford Motor Company to implement a new strategy focused on leveraging the
capabilities of its global operations. In search for improving product quality, performance and lower costs,
this automaker launched an aggressive growth strategy focused on improving the balance sheet of the
company by leveraging the capabilities offered in developing countries such as Mexico, Brazil, India and
China. As a result, high performance/low cost product development offices were established in these
countries to support the global efforts of the organization.
0.2) Motivation and Objective
The Product Development Organization in Mexico (PDOM) has been widely benefited with this growth
approach derived from the fresh organization's strategy. Since 2011 this organization has been growing at
an accelerated pace in budget, headcount and design responsibilities. Along with increased interactions,
extra complexity is currently being built within this organization and a special attention is required to
leverage its core capabilities in order to mitigate the risk of "organizational failure".
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The long term sustainability of this organization depends on multiple key metrics such as: product quality,
cost efficiency, effective project management, employee satisfaction, and performance. The interest
behind this thesis is to guarantee, as much as possible, the long run success of this organization
considered a system; therefore the goal of this work is to create a framework that can help maximize the
probability of success, as complexity and risk to failure increase. Based on this goal, the research question
behind this thesis is:
"What are some of the technical and managerial inputs, enablers and capabilities of the High-speed
growing Product Development System in Mexico that could maximize its likelihood of success when
present in its planning, execution and improving phases?"
The following hypotheses have been developed to support and guide the discussion:
i. Planning - Architecting the connections between and within the basic inputs of a Product
Development organization will enhance high levels of execution responsiveness and
quality at reduced costs.
i. Execution - In an inexperienced organization, mentoring and training employees and
investing on "ilities" are key enablers to achieve a low cost execution responsiveness and
quality, when the only true constant is change. (see list of acronyms for definition of
"ilities")
ii. Improving - Increasing learning capabilities is key to achieve BIC responsiveness and
quality while maintaining low costs.
0.3) Motivation Scenario
The intention of the following theoretical scenario is to provide a picture of what has been happening and
will continue to happen in the Product Development Organization in Mexico for the next three to five
years. Imagine Chucho Perez, he is a young engineer in his early 30's. Chucho has been working for the
Product Development Organization in Mexico for about seven years and today, he is a valuable asset due
to his high level and reliable performance at a relatively low cost (high value). During this period, he has
had the opportunity to actively participate as a product development engineer in the design, validation,
release and launch of two major new model programs and several on-going local product modifications.
He has spent a total of two years working for the parent organization in the United States under an
international assignment ramping up his technical and managerial skills through an intense training based
on learning-by-doing.
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Since Chucho has developed "enough" technical skills and has demonstrated potential leadership values,
he has been recently promoted within the Mexican organization and now he occupies a junior leadership
engineering position with eight Mexican engineers reporting directly to him. Due to the increasing
demand for engineering services as a result of the global environment in which the company executes, the
Product Development Organization in Mexico, being a key player, is facing the challenge to maintain a
sustainable growth enabling the organization to achieve success as defined in the subsequent pages. The
real challenge Chucho and many other relatively inexperienced leaders of the organization face is how to
perform to accomplish success in a high-speed changing environment. This thesis is developed with the
emphasis to provide a simple framework for leaders like Chucho who might need a simple guide to
maintain the pace towards that attainment.
0.4) Definition of Success of the Product Development Organization
The development of these thesis starts with the idea of success that the PDOM has defined to guarantee its
sustainability towards 2015. The PDOM's idea of success is based on its corporate vision which is
defined as follows: (extracted from the PDOM A3. See list of acronyms for definition of A3)
Develop Product Engineering capabilities in Mexico to support Global needs, reaching Best in Class
performance in terms of Responsiveness, Quality of execution and Cost.
Based on this definition, the first step to understand this definition of success was to create a pictorial
description of it illustrated in figure 1.
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Best in Class
Responsiveness Quality of Cost
Execution
By
achieving:
How:
Figure 1: Pictorial Definition of success of the PDOM
As figure 1 illustrates, I have decomposed this definition of success in 3 levels:
- System Level or Organizational Objective (To):
To develop Product Engineering Capabilities in Mexico to support global needs reaching best in class
performance in terms of responsiveness, quality of execution and cost.
- Strategic objectives and Action Plans (By Achieving):
People Excellence:
The first strategic goal focuses on creating a culture in the organization that differentiates the
Mexican engineers from those in other high value regions, focusing on building a team that is
outstanding due to the attitude, the quality of execution, the job culture and the intelligence among
them. To measure the current and the future state of this goal four metrics are utilized:
" Competency Level: Track the knowledge and experience of their engineers
" Key Talent Retention: Make sure that the turnover is low, especially for Key talent
" Employee Satisfaction Index: Best in class employee satisfaction
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People/Org excellence
Process Discipline
Facilities Tools &lnfrastructure
Low Cost/High Value
Improve
Plan Execute
To:
0 Headcount: Maintain headcount accurately
Process Discipline:
The second goal focuses on creating an efficient, nimble, flexible and clean organization. To
accomplish this goal, four metrics are utilized:
" Scorecard Related Metrics: Provides health status of the projects.
* Efficiency Metrics: Provides health status of the organization.
" Integrator Deliverables: Ensure processes related to the Global Product Development System
are being executed.
" Part Churning: Monitors the amount of changes to each vehicle component.
Facilities, Tools and Infrastructure:
The third strategic goal focuses on reducing the operating costs in the company by using Digital
Innovation, Computer Aided Engineering and IT, as well as an optimized office layout to promote
productivity, communication and teamwork. Two main metrics are being used:
* Facilities for New Hires: Tracks the availability of essential facilities for new members
" Facilities for Top Hats: Tracks the availability of essential facilities to develop a top-hat
program.
Low Cost / High Value Automotive Operations Alternative:
The fourth strategic goal focuses on acquiring ED&T in-sourcing responsibilities and maximizes the
use of available incentives (Federal and State incentives). Three metrics are used in order to track the
progress of this goal:
" Track the amount of cost savings
" Specific program savings: Tracks cost saving per program
- Framework Structure (How):
The bulk of this thesis is developed around the 3rd level of the decomposition of the PDOM definition of
success which I define as the "How" level. As defined in the motivation, the intention of this work is to
create a framework that can provide a basic guide for engineers like Chucho to strive for success in this
young organization. Figure 2 provides a simple illustration of how I visualize this framework. It is simple
and is intended to address the impact of the technical and managerial inputs, enablers and capabilities of
the High-speed growing PDOM present in its planning, execution and improving phases; where inputs are
shown to the left, transformation happening in the center enhanced by controls and enablers, and outputs
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generated to the right. The transformation square (center) is represented by the strategic objectives and
action plans defined by the PDOM previously.
V
[6t
Figure 2: Context Diagram for Definition of Success
0.5) Research Method
To explore the research topic that motivated this thesis, the first action I performed was to draft a set of
questions that could guide the development and generation of information. These questions were
generates as a result of my own curiosity, experience and passion about the research topic and enriched
from general thoughts extracted from the PDOM SDM meetings. These questions are focused on guiding
the discussions of each of the main structure chapters as proposed in the framework of Figure 2 (planning,
execution and improving) towards answering their respective hypotheses. The complete set of questions
can be found in Appendix A, and the overall explanation of what the PDOM SDM meeting is and the
ideas extracted from it can be found in Appendix C.
To obtain the answers for the planning phase questions explored in Chapter one, an interview-based
approach was applied to a real life failure example in order to obtain insight from six key stakeholders of
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the CCSE organization in Mexico. With the agreement from each of the interviewees, these short
interviews were conducted as informal chats and the objective was to generate, from the planning
perspective of the organization, an overall idea of what led to the qualitative failure of the CCSE
organization in Mexico during its initial stages. The general insight obtained from this interview can be
reviewed in Appendix B. With this insight, a systems decomposition approach was applied to the same
failure case to evidence the importance of defining the basic inputs of a product development system and
its links during the planning phase.
In order to obtain answers for the execution phase questions explored in Chapter two, a couple of
theoretical cases extracted from real assumptions of the PDOM were evaluated under a system dynamics
approach to illustrate the effect of a relatively inexperienced workforce on the overall productivity of the
organization when the only constant is change. This approach was also implemented to illustrate the
benefits of a strategy based on a mentoring and training policy that could potentially mitigate the effect of
the inexperienced organization on its productivity. The system dynamics method applied in this chapter is
based on the theory developed by Oliva and Sterman (2010).
Finally, to obtain answers for the improving phase questions in Chapter three, a system dynamics
approach developed by Repenning and Sterman (2001) was also implemented to illustrate the importance
of embracing learning capabilities to improve the organizations performance. In this chapter, this
approach was used as the method to illustrate the dynamics of work harder and work smarter loops in the
overall responsiveness, execution quality and cost of the organization. An illustrative real case was
exposed as evidence to demonstrate the effect of these loops. In the second part of this chapter, a
capability-based analysis developed by Spear (2009) was used as the method to illustrate the importance
of increasing capabilities through the dynamics of the learning cycle in order to enhance work smarter
loops.
0.6) Thesis Overview
While you read this thesis you will find a vast pool of acronyms. Please use the list of acronyms in page
11 to understand them. This thesis is divided in three principal chapters to follow the development of the
framework structure. Chapter one develops on the importance of dedicating time to plan the inputs (goals,
people, products, services, processes and tools) of an organization and its links as key to achieve success.
A real life example illustrates how "qualitative failure" prevailed during the early conception stages of the
young PDOM CCSE organization due to the lack of planning of the basic inputs of the system and failure
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to identify its connections. Equally, this chapter provides an example of how the basic inputs of the
organization could be defined to minimize the risk of failure. Finally this chapter provides a discussion
around which type of team structure should prevail in the PDOM in order to maintain flexibility,
adaptability and agility.
The second part of the framework focuses on the enablers that allow success during the execution phase
of the organization. In order to present illustrative results, Chapter two develops two theoretical cases that
illustrate the effect of an inexperienced organization over the overall average productivity of the
organization and how this rookie effect can be mitigated with a mentoring and training policy considering
the side effects of it. Chapter two also frames the importance of maintaining flexibility, agility and
adaptability to overcome the effect of change during the execution phase of the organization.
Chapter three provides an illustrative case of how learning capabilities can help the organization to
improve its overall execution and why sometimes organizations fail to do that by falling into the vicious
cycle of suppressing learning. As in the previous chapter, two theoretical cases are evaluated under a
system dynamics approach to illustrate the importance of documenting and spreading leaning through the
virtuous cycle of learning to achieve success. The second part of this chapter provides an overview of
how to beat the vicious cycle of suppressing learning by focusing on policies that yield results in the short
and long terms. To illustrate the implementation of such policies, a real life example is presented as
evidence to support the arguments.
Finally, Chapter four provides a summary of the main ideas extracted from each of the chapters and a
series of suggestions directed to Chucho in regards to how to plan, how to execute and how to improve
the organization.
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Chapter 1: Planning
Hypothesis - Architecting the connections between and within the basic inputs of a Product
Development organization will enhance high levels of execution responsiveness and quality
at reduced costs.
Figure 3: Inputs of a Product Development System
The first step of the linking framework illustrated in Figure 2 is related to the planning phase of a system.
The intention of this chapter is to demonstrate the importance of correctly identifying the inputs of the
Product Development System and the importance of designing the links within and between them to focus
on achieving success as defined by the organization; and how this design contributes to the transformation
of the desired strategic objectives of the PDOM. In order to guide the discussion, the following questions
have been formulated to support the generation of information.
* What are the basic inputs of the Product Development System?
* How these inputs should be designed (planed) to maximize chances of success?
* What characteristics should the employees of the organization have to execute the action plans?
" Based on the incoming responsibilities acquired by the PDOM, what type of organization should
execute the plans?
1.1) Architecting and Planning Product Development Systems Inputs
The initial step to designing a system is to understand where the system is currently standing, where the
system wants to be in the future, and what is needed to get where the system wants to be. My experience
working at a complex product development organization indicates that the first step to build a culture
looking forward to achieving success is to understand and define the essential inputs of the System during
the planning phase.
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What are the basic inputs of the product development system? The Product Development System is
defined by Aguirre (2008) as "all the elements, links and structure necessary to develop a new product".
In his thesis, he cites the work previously developed by Browning, Fricke, and Negele in 2006 to define
the basic elements of structure of a product development system as: "Organizational Goals, Products,
Services, Processes, People and Tools (Aguirre, 2008, pp. 39)."
In the context of the framework explored in this thesis, I define these elements of structure as the key
Inputs for the long run success of a High-Speed growing organization. The method used in in this chapter
is based on a systems decompositions approach applied to illustrate the importance of identifying the
hierarchical design levels of these inputs in early stages of the organization creation process in order to
achieve the strategic objectives. Figure 4 provides an illustration of how these basic inputs of a Product
Development system are linked/connected and interact together in the context of this thesis. This figure
can be described as follows: The goals of the organization are achieved when the right people design,
validate, release and launch high quality, low cost products and services through robust and uniform
processes with the support of tools and infrastructure.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Product Service
Process
People Tools
Figure 4: Essential Elements of Product Development System
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1.1.1) Decomposition of Inputs (People, Product/Service and Process)
During the system's planning phase, one of the most common approaches to fully understand its elements
of form and function is by decomposing systems into sub-systems and components. The next relevant
question to support the development of the hypothesis is how should the inputs in Figure 4 be designed in
order to meet the strategic objectives and action plans of the organization? Steven J. Spear (2005)
elaborated a useful normative or framework intended to identify four distinct levels of decomposition and
the appropriate design questions associated with each decomposition level. This framework can be
applied in the analysis of both tangible and intangible systems (inputs), and the basic elements as well as
the questions inherent to each of those levels are defined in table 1:
Table 1: Hierarchical Decomposition Levels (Modified from Spear, 2005)
Hierarchical Critical Questions
Decomposition Levels
What goals and objectives should the elements (inputs) meet?
System
Objectives What product, services or information does the organization produce and
deliver, for whom, when?
What individual functions are assigned to what elements, components, or
Architecture/ pieces in the system?
Responsibility Who is responsible for what work-Activities, to create what intermediate
product, service, or information for whom, in what order?
How are the elements, components, or pieces connected between and
within?
Interface / Connections
Exchanges / handoff How does someone indicate that they need an item (product, service, or
information), and how does those who supply and item learn that
something is needed?
What are the designs of the individual elements, components, or pieces of
Components/ the system, given the functions and interfaces assigned to them?
Methods What are the work-element content, sequence, timing, location, and output
for people to do the work for which they are responsible?
The best way to illustrate the application of this framework is by developing an example. Let us assume
that this framework can be utilized to decompose components, sub-systems, and systems; and that the
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performance of a component would affect the overall performance of the whole system. Given the latter, I
analyzed the Climate Control Systems Engineering (CCSE) Organization in Mexico as the example to
apply the decomposition framework in order to obtain insight to whether architecting the connections
between and within the basic inputs of a Product Development organization will enhance or not high
levels of execution responsiveness and quality at reduced costs. This example was developed with the
collaboration of key stakeholders of the CCSE organization in Mexico and the focus was to provide both
an example of the advantages that this normative or framework provides and also to set the initial grounds
of what the CCSE organization in Mexico should look like to get aligned with the definition of success
previously defined.
1.1.2) Example of Inputs Decomposition (CCSE organization in Mexico)
In order to understand this example I should state that each of the inputs in Figure 4 were considered
input components of the CCSE organization in Mexico and are suitable to being decomposed, therefore
the information contained in table 2 below was generated by answering each of the questions of the
hierarchical decomposition framework applied to the CCSE organization in Mexico.
System Level design of the CCSE organization Inputs:
Working from the top of the Hierarchical Decomposition Level framework, the first step to understand
the organization is to define the "To-Be" System level objectives of each of its key inputs. Based on the
interviews with key stakeholders of the organization, we defined system level objectives for each of the
inputs of the "To-Be" organization. (See System level in table 2)
Architecture Level of the CCSE organization Inputs:
The second level in the hierarchical decomposition framework is the "To-Be" Architecture of the system.
As Edward Crawley defines, architecture is "The embodiment of concept and the allocation of
physical/informational function to elements of form, and definition of relationships among the elements
and with the surrounding context (Crawley, 2011)." The architecture is determined by the elements of
form and function that coexist and interact within the system; the design of each element of form plus the
design of the interactions between them will command the emerging behaviors of the whole system. The
elements of form can be both tangible as for example people performing within the organization and
physical components; and intangible as for example activities or tasks. (See Architecture level in table 2)
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Interfaces / Connection Level of the CCSE organization Inputs:
With the high level definition of the "To-Be" architecture, the third step of the hierarchical level
decomposition is to identify Interfaces and Connections within the architecture. This links embody both
the physical and information connections between the elements of form in the system. I anticipate the
outcome of this step to be one of the most crucial in the planning of the Low Cost / High Value CCSE
Organization since good interfaces facilitate the generation of a lightweight structure enabling effective
communication towards problem solving. Section 1.4 provides a real life case were poor interfaces and
connection lead to an organizational failure. The outcome yielded from this example idealizes a CCSE
organization oriented to maintaining a system integration mindset in order to keep track of the
interactions happening within each of the employees and how they should follow integrated processes to
understanding the interfaces/connections happening in the design of products and services. (See Interfaces
and Connections level in table 2)
Component Level of the CCSE organization:
In the fourth and final step, the lowest level of the hierarchical decomposition framework is to define the
components design. The components are defined as the individual elements of form that integrate the
architecture of the system. These elements of form can be defined as sub-systems of the parent system
and can also be decomposed for further analysis. As mentioned previously, the elements of form can be
both tangible as for example people performing within the organization and physical components; and
intangible as for example activities or tasks. (See Component level in table 2)
Table 2: Summary of Hierarchical Decomposition Level of the Low Cost / high Value CCSE
Organization
Inputs of the CCSE organization in Mexico
People (Organization) Service Product Process
System
(Objectives) 1) To support global PD Low cost/high value Low cost/high value Robust and clear
operations by becoming a (on time, effective (on time, effective processes to provide
low cost/high value (on and low cost) and low cost) a consistent method
time, effective and low engineering and Vehicle (Top-Hat) to generate the
cost) CCSE organization. managing services. Climate Control desired services and
Systems and AC products.
2) To become the global lines that meet or
CCSE organization's exceed Quality,
excellence design center Cost, Weight, and
for AC lines. Function targets
(QCWF).
3) To support top-hat
initiatives in Mexico by
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developing Climate
Control Product
Engineering and
managerial capabilities.
1) AC lines core
engineers and D&R with
CAD capabilities
oriented to designing,
validating, releasing and
launching AC lines.
2) System integration,
PAT, and applications
engineers oriented to
connecting / integrating
CCSE sub-systems
throughout the
development of a
program.
3) CAE engineers to
support sub-system
development and
validation activities
High Skilled/low cost
Mexican engineers
Design, validation,
release, and launch
(activities) of CCSE
Component, sub-
systems, and
systems, performed
by engineers.
On time, effective
and efficient
individual
engineering and
managerial
deliverables.
Tangible CCSE
Systems composed
of modified/carry
over refrigerant and
air handling sub-
system architectures,
comprised of
modified/carry over
parts and interfaces.
1 4 1
Systems integration
engineers connecting /
leading application
engineers and AC lines
D&R teams and
supported by PAT and
CAE engineers.
Systems Integration-
oriented design and
execution to connect
component, sub-
system and system
development
activities.
Critical
modified/carry over
physical interfaces /
connections within
CCSE components /
sub-systems and
with other sub-
systems such as
Body Interior, Body
Exterior, Powertrain
and Electrical.
CCSE components
designed to meet
component
sub/system and
system level
requirements and
attributes.
I
Follow Functional
and Program related
process architecture
based on the GPDS
architecture to
design, validate,
release and launch.
Engineering (EMM)
and Program (PST)
processes to
maintain a systems
integration-oriented
focus.
Program = GPDS
deliverables, To4
and PMT processes
Engineering = SDS,
ARL, Design Rules,
Robustness, SCCAF
Mechanical Package
= DPA, Virtual
series
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Architecture
(Responsibility)
Interface /
Connections
(Exchange /
Handoffs)
Components
(Methods)
I- I
As part of the planning phase, this decomposition framework provided a valuable tool to define the
potential basic architecture, interfaces, connections, and components (Form and Function) of the "To-Be"
CCSE organization, oriented to achieving its ultimate system goals. Along with the information generated
here, this exercise provided a useful tool to create a pictorial illustration of the "To-Be" CCSE
organization's architecture that could potentially preform accordingly to meet the requirements of the
ideal organization defined above (Figure 5: CCSE desired organization architecture decomposition). This
potential organization architecture was designed to enhance communication between and within the
stakeholders; although the potential benefit will only be measured once this structure is implemented.
Figure 5: CCSE "To-Be" organization architecture decomposition
Finally the Hierarchical decomposition level framework developed in this chapter provides a simple
method to map and illustrate systems decomposition. This decomposition of systems is helpful to
understand the complexity within the basic inputs or elements of a system and ultimately mitigate it.
Although it is true that this exercise provides an illustrative example of how inputs could be architected,
this by itself does not allow to generate a finn conclusion in regards to whether it is true or not that
planning the links between and within the inputs will help the PDOM to become the best engineering
organization in terms of responsiveness, quality of execution and cost. In order to obtain clearer
information to support the hypothesis, this framework was also applied to illustrate, from a planning
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perspective, why systems could fail if the inputs' hierarchical decomposition level is not understood. The
following case shows how lack of inputs connections identification and complexity led to an
organizational failure due to the emergence of siloization.
1.2) Understand Failure in the Inputs Planning Phase
1.2.1) Planning inputs: Real Life Failure Example
The example used to develop the failure story is based again on the CCSE organization in Mexico which
first couple of years of life where turbulent and problematic. The results, although not catastrophic, forced
the organization to revise its original goals. The following analysis provides a snapshot of the hierarchical
decomposition level of key inputs such as goals, products and services and an explanation of why this
organization failed in its early years of life. The information was again obtained through personal
experience and interviews with key stakeholders of this organization which were affected by the initial
turmoil. Their testimonies helped to understand the dynamics and complexity involved in this failure (See
Appendix B: Why CCSE failed during its early stages?).
Note: In this example I highlighted in red, the elements that we concluded contributed to the failure of the
organization.
What was wrong, from the People (organization) perspective, with the alignment of goals,
architecture, interfaces and components?
Table 3: Failure case (People)
Hierarchical
Decomposition Critical Question Response
Level
1) To become a low cost/high value appendix
of the North American CCSE organization to
People/Organization What goals and objectives should support new and current programs
objectives the organization meet?
2) To develop CCSE applications and core
engineering capabilities in Mexico
Refrigerant and air handling sub-system core
Architecture What individual functions are engineers and applications D&R oriented to
assigned to what elements, design, validate, release and launch CCSE
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components, or pieces in the components.
organization?
How are the elements, Unidentified interface/connection between
Interface/Connection components, or pieces connected applications D&R engineers and core
within? engineers. Independent silos with no
interactions between them
What are the designs of the
individual elements, components,
Components or pieces of the system, given the High Skilled/low cost Mexican engineers
functions and interfaces assigned
to them?
What was wrong, from the Product/Service perspective, with the alignment of goals, architecture,
interfaces and components?
Note: In this example we defined "product" as an engineering service provided by the CCSE organization.
Table 4: Failure case (Product/Service)
Hierarchical
Decomposition Critical Question Response
Level
Product/Service What goals and objectives should To produce low cost/high value engineering
Objectives the product/service provided services to support the North American
meet? Climate Control organization
What individual functions are Design, validation, release, and launch
Architecture assigned to what elements, engineering activities performed by D&R's
components, or pieces of the and core engineers
product/service?
How are the elements, Unidentified links/connections between
Interface/Connection components, or pieces connected component, sub-system and system
within? development activities performed by the
D&R's and core engineers
What are the designs of the On time, effective and efficient individual
Components individual elements, components, engineering and managerial deliverables.
or pieces of the system, given the
functions and interfaces assigned
to them?
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What was wrong, from the Process perspective, with the alignment of goals, architecture, interfaces
and components?
Note: This table is limited to provide an example of process decomposition of the core engineers of the
CCSE organization.
Table 5: Failure case (Process)
Hierarchical
Decomposition Critical Question Response
Level
What product, services or
Process Objectives information does the organization To improve component suppliers quality 
and
produce and deliver, for whom, efficiency
when?
Who is responsible for what Core engineers in Mexico should provide
. work-Activities, to create what engineering support and review quality
Pathways/Responsibi intermediate product, service, or claims with component suppliers located in
lities information for whom, in what Mexico
order?
How does someone indicate that Core engineers should track field quality
Connection/Exchang they need an item (product, reports and review them with component
o ei n service, or information), and how suppliers with an open issues list. Core
es does those who supply and item engineers should share insight to improve
learn that something is needed? manufacturing quality.
What is the work-element
Component work- content, sequence, timing, Field quality data should be 
available to core
activity/Methods location, and output for people to engineers to conduct 
active support to
do the work for which they are suppliers.
responsible?
1.2.2) Final Notes and Conclusions of Real Life Failure Example
To start the discussion it is important to mention that the CCSE organization in Mexico fought to survive
during its first year of existence. Qualitatively speaking, it failed to deliver the desired levels of execution
responsiveness and quality expected by the PDOM. This failure was translated in undesired levels of
attrition, poor execution responsiveness, low quality and as a result, high operating costs. From the
people (organization) perspective we can conclude that the CCSE organization failed to perform at the
desired levels of responsiveness and quality for three reasons:
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1. Poor definition of system goals. These goals were simply not realistic not achievable with the current
technical capabilities of the CCSE organization in Mexico, the available infrastructure and the
company's financial situation since by definition, core engineers required high levels of technical
skills and full time contact with specialized tools not available in Mexico.
2. As a consequence of the previous point, the architecture of the CCSE organization in Mexico was
poorly designed.
3. With a poor architecture design, the interactions and connections between key engineers failed since
those were not properly identified either. As a result, core engineers had little or no incentives to
interact with applications engineers for the following reasons:
" Core engineers activities were independent of any program timing
" Core engineers in Mexico did not belong to a specific integration team
* Core engineers in Mexico had poor communication with core engineers in USA
" Core engineers activities in Mexico were not linked to the activities developed by the
applications engineers in Mexico
" Coaching and mentoring was sporadic and inconsistent
" Two independent silos emerged with independent goals and objectives
Consistently, an analysis of the engineering services that were generated in this organization suggests as
well that the activities performed by one key engineer had little or no relation with the activities
performed by other. Interfaces and connections between people, processes and products/services failed
and communication was not enabled, as a result, the engineering services in this organization were not
compact. Two independent engineering services emerged as a result of poor interconnections; one
oriented to core engineering activities and the other focused on engineering application. In this case the
CCSE organization in Mexico performed close to what a Low-performing organizations looks like where
those tend to be purelyfunctional oriented and do not manage the relationships among all the elements
adequately (see section 1.3.1 for a definition of functional oriented team).
From a processes perspective, it is important to introduce the definition of an STA engineer. The roll of
these engineers is to provide the necessary technical support to the suppliers in order to guarantee the
accomplishment of quality targets required by the Global Product Development Organization. This in
paper sounds similar to what the core engineers in the CCSE organization in Mexico were assigned to do.
This absence of clear roles and responsibilities led the organization to perform redundant processes that
did not add value to the outcome of the organization.
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Based on this information we can summarize the failure as a result of:
" Poor definition of system goals.
" Poorly designed architecture of the organization
" Poor identification of the interfaces/connections of inputs
* Poor definition of processes
Finally, this example was useful to illustrate how a poor definition and design of inputs like people
(organization), product/services, and processes led the CCSE organization in Mexico to underperform
(slow responsiveness and quality) and eventually to increase its operating costs. Furthermore, this
analysis helped to demonstrate that when links and connections were not identified properly, the risk of
failure was evident. Section 1.3.1 of this chapter provides a deeper analysis to support this conclusion.
1.3) People as Input and Enabler
One of the key inputs of the organization that can guarantee success is the people that integrate it. The
subsequent sections of chapter one argue about the importance of hiring the best people and providing
them with the best tools to achieve BIC in execution responsiveness, quality and cost. The statement
below is probably one of the truest statements I have ever read.
"In my forty-eight years in the auto industry, I probably made six hundred speeches about management.
Since my retirement, I've made many more. And I've always said the same thing: Here's what
management is about: Pick good people and set the right priorities (Lee lacoca)."
"Hiring is a unique moment and opportunity for an organization; it allows infusion of new thoughts,
perspectives and energy allowing the organization to stay fresh. It is also the point in time at which much
of the intrinsic direction and culture of the organization will be defined. So important is hiring the right
people, that pressure to grow an organization must never prevail over the search for the right talent and
individuals (Aguirre, 2008)." The general consensus agrees that one of the key inputs to organizational
success is the talent available to execute as desired. Without this talent the chances of success in the long
run significantly diminish. Equally important is to provide this new talent with the necessary tools to
execute successfully.
This section is focused on providing a guideline at the planning phase that will help the organization to
select the best people during the recruiting process as part of the essential definition of this input;
individuals that are paid more but are worth more. In order to answer the question about what
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characteristics should the employees of the organization have, these guidelines were developed by
compiling information from key stakeholders of the PDOM and recommendations obtained from
literature. The following elaborates on the critical characteristics that should be observed and considered
when hiring new talent, forming teams and retaining talent:
Attributes of individuals and teams extracted from Thomson and Tracy (1993) and notes obtained from
SDM meetings:
- Owns the outcome: People that show interest in thinking, analyzing, and delivering better
results than ever before, in other words, obsessed with perfection.
- Demonstrates full engagement and commitment: People capable of working together and
committed to the outcome of their work.
- Builds confidence in others: People committed to their own development and its peers.
Always looking to gofurther and turned on by the opportunity to prove something or have
greater impact.
- Capable of understanding the tasks to be performed: Clever and intelligent people relentlessly
searching for wisdom. Passionate people fostering technical excellence.
- Loud voice to be heard: People and teams capable of clearly communicating things that went
well and/or wrong.
More information and deeper analysis has been developed in the work of Adrian Aguirre (2008) and
Takahiro Endo (2008). In their work both argue that the hiring process has to be designed taking into
account the individual characteristics mentioned above. The successful planning of the hiring process will
afterwards become a key enabler during the execution phase to achieve the action plans towards
achieving success.
1.3.1) Planning the Team Structure:
Indeed people attributes are relevant to the success of an organization, but planning accordingly to hire
the best people is not enough to execute properly. An adequate team structure and architecture is required
to leverage the people's capabilities. Within the next few years, the PDOM will observe an increasing
demand for engineering services and will have to learn to operate appropriately to satisfy it. Along with
this, the organization will have to learn to respond to change during execution; therefore it will have to
find a way to maintain flexibility, agility and adaptability. Wheelwright and Clark (1992) and Spear
(2005) define four types of product development teams:
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Autonomous: Composed of people from different disciplines working as a single group usually clustered
together at an off-site location and away from normal resources and incentives provided by the parent
organization. This allows cross-functional problem solving, enables continuous communication and
integration, and allows discussion around problem solving and concept generation. This team structure is
desired when system goals and objectives have not been designed.
Example: Directors and Functional Chiefs in charge of:
- Strategy definition
- Establish design goals and objectives
Heavyweight: A rigid structured team led by senior managers with authority to allocate resources and
delegate responsibilities at their teams' convenience. Since these teams share characteristics from the
autonomous and functional teams, they show a high degree of communication and integration while
focusing on a component level technical development. This team structure is desired to design functions
within the product and responsibilities within the team (Architecture).
Example: Teams led by Functional and Program Chiefs and managers capable of controlling its
own resources:
- Assign function to elements responsibilities
- Assign elements to people responsibilities
Lightweight: A more flexible structure that combines the advantages of heavyweight and functional
teams, where tight communications and integration are emphasized though a less senior manager compare
to the heavyweight team. The main responsibility of the leading managers in a lightweight team is to
facilitate communication and discussions across boundaries in order to motivate problem solving. This
team is desired when interfaces and connections have to be designed.
Example: Teams composed of people from different backgrounds to facilitate communications,
and which team members are empowered to make decisions at the low hierarchical levels:
- Design product interfaces and act as connections between functional teams.
Functional: Formed with people from different disciplines who contribute at a component or sub-system
level and which, as opposed to the autonomous teams, remain within their parent organization physically
and in terms of accountability. This structure allows the team members to gain deep insight about their
technical knowledge and apply it to new product design. This team structure is desired to provide deep
technical expertise to designing components.
Example: Core engineering teams led by technical leaders:
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- Deep technical expertise
Each of the team types has its own strengths and weaknesses and the advantage of one team type over
other depends on which level of the system design wants to be accomplished. What is the team type that
should dominate the relatively young PDOM? In order to answer this question we should clarify that the
responsibility of the PDOM within the next years will be to design, validate, release and launch top-hat
products. Antonio del Puerto (2010) defines Top-hat products as: "all new, single model, single series
vehicle development programs that are built upon a validated legacy platform and thus a previous top hat.
Customized vehicles made with components that are intended to provide differentiation from other
products built from the same platform (del Puerto, 2010)."
The key concept extracted from this definition is: "to create a new product based on an existing
architecture". By definition this requires a high degree of component integration, interface design and
systems oriented execution based on communications, therefore the focus of the PDOM will have to
address the complexity of creating interfaces and connections effectively within inputs like people,
products/services, and processes and tools. The Product Development Organization in Mexico is facing a
huge opportunity to construct the foundations to perform as a High-Velocity (high-performing)
organization. Steven J. Spear (2009) argues that low-performing organizations tend to be functional
oriented and do not manage the relationships among all its elements adequately. These organizations
usually fall under the "silo" effect, where their different departments execute independently without a real
integration, relying on the performance of their functional teams only, leading them to fail.
Communication gets complicated and usually firefighting arises due to lack of integration in their
execution phases.
Furthermore, del Puerto concludes extensively on the importance of addressing continuous and clear
communication in the development of top-hats. The following arguments are conclusions extracted from
his work (del Puerto, 2010):
" "Constant communication between the Design Engineers co-located in the engineering site and
the Design Engineers collocated in the Studio is crucial. Touch screens and conferencing tools
must be used in both sides to improve informal communication prior to Engineering cut-off.
" It is imperative that the Design Engineer takes the role of system integrator from the surface
perspective, this is, they must be aware of all the potential surface changes derived from the
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informal communication processes, understand the implication to surfaces of other components,
and lead the resolution that best accomplishes vehicle performance of attributes, cost and quality.
" There must be daily information exchange between the Engineering organization and the Design
Studio to communicate any issues that would impact styling.
" Periodical face-to-face meetings are also important to improve the willingness to accept
ambiguous information and to reduce the effects of the "not-invented here" syndrome by
enhancing the team identity (del Puerto, 2010)."
The common concepts embedded in these conclusions are: links, exchanges, communication and
integration which imply the utilization of interfaces and connections therefore, these conclusions suggest
that a lightweight team structure can address the need for these links between inputs. Given the relatively
young structure and inexperience of this organization, the efforts should be focused on properly managing
the connections and interfaces of people, services, products and processes; so as defined previously, it
will become vital for this organization to learn to operate under a Lightweight structure in order to
maintain flexibility through tight communications. Section 1.2 of this chapter provided a supportive
example of how the silo effect led the CCSE organization in Mexico to fail during its early years of life.
This means the CCSE organization failed to incorporate a lightweight approach since interfaces and
connections were absent.
1.4) Hypothesis conclusion
Chapter one was mainly developed to answer the following hypothesis: Architecting the connections
between and within the basic inputs of a Product Development organization will enhance high
levels of execution responsiveness and quality at reduced costs. The failure example analyzed in
section 1.2 has proven to be useful enough to asseverate that the hypothesis stated above is true in
complex systems; but although planning the inputs of an organization and its links might enhance high
levels of execution responsiveness and quality at reduced costs, the planning phase of an organization is
founded on the definition of multiple assumptions such as: demand for products and services, capability
to respond to that demand and desired performance of the organization among others. By definition,
assumptions are things that are accepted as true or as certain to happen, without proof (google definition),
therefore assumptions are susceptible to change.
A key element to maximize chances of success is not only to identify as much assumptions as possible
but to transform those not proven assumptions into proven knowledge; but although planning is important,
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organizations should recognize that not all outcomes are predictable. The data that would let
organizations be more certain about their future simple might not exist yet (Gunther and MacMillan,
2009). The real challenge here is to determine the amount of time that should be allocated in order to
transform the maximum possible amount of assumptions from not proven to proven; but at the same time
making sure that the time allocated for planning is used efficiently.
Second, the hierarchical decomposition framework provides a supportive argument in favor of the
hypothesis confirmation. It demonstrated how critical it is to plan/architect correctly the inputs of a
complex system during the planning phase, specially the links between and within them. When inputs are
not correctly identified as seeing in section 1.2, failure is likely to occur. Several relevant questions were
used to focus the discussion around confirming it and the answers that support this statement are:
What are the basic inputs of an organization?
Aguirre (2008) and Browning, Fricke, and Negele (2006) identify Goals, Service, Product, Process,
People and Tools, as the basic elements of product development systems.
How these inputs should be designed?
The decomposition framework used in this chapter is a useful tool (nevertheless not the only one) to
design each input at the following levels: System, Architecture, Interfaces and Components.
What characteristics should the employees of the organization show to execute the action plans?
- Owns the outcome
- Demonstrates full engagement and commitment
- Builds confidence in others
- Capable of understanding the tasks to be performed
- Loud voice to be heard
What type of organization should execute the action plans in order to maintain attributes such as
flexibility?
Again, the failure case presented in section 1.2 suggests that a predominant but not exclusive lightweight
approach is desired to enable continuous communication within the PDOM and the parent PD
organization in order to avoid the silo effect. Figure 5 provides an example of links in the CCSE
organization. A key element to maximize success is to keep consistency between the level of design and
the type of organization implemented to design it. The product development organization in Mexico will
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be focused mainly on integrating existing and new vehicle components and sub-systems with relatively
minor modifications to create top-hat automobiles, and accurate communications skills will be required to
beat complexity (see definition of top-hat in section 1.3.1). As a result, integration activities will become
key elements for success. The framework presented in this first chapter suggests that integration and
connections should be developed by a Lightweight organization to facilitate communication and
discussions across boundaries in order to motivate problem solving at the lowest levels.
Also from this case we can see that interfaces and connections within a system are critical to avoid
individual silos and enhance flexibility. This case demonstrated how failing to identify correctly the
interfaces and connections in the planning phase of products/services and organizations slowed down the
organization's execution speed and quality preventing it to become the best in class organization in that
respect. From this case it is valid to argue that the ability to achieve success as defined in this high
velocity Product Development organization will be measured by the capability it has to identify links and
connections within and between the different sub-organizations that compose it.
When we think about a car we think of an integrated machine greater than the sum of its parts. A critical
attribute of an automobile is the degree of integration between its sub-systems and the effectiveness to
connect the whole with the users. For example, the climate control system is tightly linked to the
Powertrain system. Both systems exchange material, information and energy. In order to blow cool, de-
humidified air inside the cabin, it is necessary to pump a refrigerant substance through the automobiles
refrigerant sub-system. The pumping action is performed by transferring a rotation energy coming from
the engine, into the AC compressor; therefore if the engine does not work, the air conditionings will not
either.
This simple example illustrates how critical it becomes to understand the interfaces and connections
between sub-systems. Failure to identify them during the design planning phase will lead to inaccurate
design assumptions. Equally, failure to connect the various functional activities will result in poor
communications as seen in the failure case. In other words, the conclusion of this chapter suggests that the
PDOM should learn to operate primarily as a lightweight organization.
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Chapter 2: Execution
Hypothesis - In an inexperienced organization, mentoring and training employees and
investing on "ilities" are key enablers to achieve a low cost execution responsiveness and
quality, when the only true constant is change. (Refer to the list of acronyms for a definition of
"ilities")
Figure 6: Execution Enablers
The PDOM will phase within the next 5 years an increasing demand for product development
(engineering) services. The biggest challenge will be to respond to this demand with what has been
defined as an inexperienced organization. In the previous chapter we discussed the importance of hiring
the best people and the suggested structure of the organization, now the question is how the organization
should execute in order to achieve success as defined in the beginning of this thesis. In order to guide the
discussion, the following relevant questions are stated:
" What are the common reasons why young organizations fail to respond to increasing demand for
services?
* What is the effect of the inexperience organization during the execution phase on achieving
success?
* What is the effect of the "pressure to do more with less" during the execution phase on achieving
success?
* How are the "rookie factor" and the "pressure to do more with less" overcome?
* What are some of the "ilities" necessary to sustain the organization in a constantly changing
environment?
Previous studies focused on establishing the basic grounding of the PDOM suggest that a Mentoring and
training policy is one of the key enablers to reach success (see Aguirre, 2008). But this policy has to be
supported by a continuous investment on emerging attributes defined as "ilities" such as flexibility, agility
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and adaptability to enhance the capabilities of the organization towards achieving the ultimate goals
especially when the only constant is change. The focus of this chapter is to present two organizational
enablers that could contribute to execute the action plans defined by the PDOM as: Low Cost / High
Value operations, People Excellence, Process Discipline, and Facilities, Tool & infrastructure, taking into
account the relative inexperience of its members.
In Chapter one (Planning) we explored the advantages of understanding the design levels of some of the
key inputs of the organization (goals, services, products, processes) towards achieving long run success.
Also, the key characteristics that should be considered when hiring a new employee and the importance of
providing the necessary tools and facilities as inputs and enablers towards success were presented. This
chapter is focused on addressing the effects of: 1) Mentoring and training and 2) Investing on "ilities"
as key enablers to achieve success.
To start this discussion, the first question is why choosing these two enablers? To answer it we should
keep in mind that the main product of the PD organization in Mexico is an engineering service. Oliva and
Sterman in their paper Death Spirals and Virtuous Cycles (2010) conclude that during the execution phase,
"service organizations are commonly trapped in vicious cycles that prevent them to respond to service
demand mainly for two reasons (Oliva and Sterman, 2010):"
" The rookie factor effect: Inexperienced organizations facing growing service demands struggle to
acquire capacity fast enough deriving into lack of productivity.
* The continuous pressure to "do more with less" pushes organizations to operate with little margin
to accommodate demand variability and creates a bum-out effect
The following sections develop on these two reasons.
2.1) The Effect of an Inexperienced Organization on the Productivity
2.1.1) Rookie Factor Effect
A system dynamics model is used as the method to illustrate how and why organizations struggle to
acquire capacity fast enough during the execution phase to respond to services demand and the impact of
inexperienced employees on its average productivity as concluded by Oliva and Sterman. In order to
support and present tangible results, two case scenarios developed with real and theoretical data, are
applied to the discussion of this section.
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i. Case scenario
In order to model the rookie effect in the performance of the organization, a theoretical scenario was
developed based on some of the current assumptions of the PDOM established in the A3 (see list of
acronyms for definition of A3). Let us assume that the PDOM would have to increase its headcount from
approximately 550 employees to 1000 employees from 2011 Calendar Year (CY) to 2015 CY as a
response to one of the principal needs of the global product development organization; to development
low cost/high value engineering services (design, validation, release and launch). The initial metrics of
the organization suggests that 30% of these employees in Mexico are considered inexperienced. I define
them as new co-workers that have had little or no exposure to the PD organization's systems, products,
services, processes and tools. The target towards 2015 CY is to reduce the amount of inexperienced
employees from 30% by the end of 2011 CY to 10% by the end of 2015 CY at a rate of 5% per year in
order to improve the average productivity of the organization. In other words, increase the amount of
experienced employees from 70% to 90% in the same period. I define experienced employees as co-
workers capable of applying, leveraging or mastering systems, products, services, processes and tools.
Given this scenario, it is important to assume the following modeling conditions obtained from real
assumptions:
* Period = beginning of 2011 CY to end of 2015 CY
* Workforce at the beginning of year 2011 = 550 employees
* Constant Rookie productivity fraction (Build) = 20%
o Literature suggests that in complex services organizations such as financial and product
development, the rookie productivity fraction is 20% of afully experienced employee.
(Sterman, 2000)
* Experienced Employee constant average productivity fraction (Apply, leverage, Master) = 80%
* Inexperienced Quit fraction = 30% per year
* Experienced Quit fraction = 10% per year
* Average assimilation Time = 104 weeks (2 years). Based on CCSE technical maturity model
* Year over year Headcount growth rate is given by the desired Headcount level at the end of each
year and is indicated in table 6:
Table 6: PDOM expected Growth Rate
End of 2011 End of 2012 End of 2013 End of 2014 End of 2015
Headcount 651 780 934 934 1000
Growth Rate 18% 19% 19% 0% 7%
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To keep the model simple it is assumed that every new employee has been hired taking in consideration
the attributes laid down in chapter one, and each of them are considered inexperienced regardless the
amount of time spent and experience gained working with a competitor or analogue industry. It is
important to point out that in this model employees gain experience automatically and without cost and
the attrition rate is fixed and not influenced by factors such as employee satisfaction. Also, it is assumed
that experienced employees perform in such a way that they achieve the desired execution responsiveness,
quality and cost to become BIC.
ii. Dynamic Model Description
The simple model illustrated in Figure 7 is useful to understand the dynamics of the learning curve in an
organization and how this acquires capacity to respond to service demand by increasing the effectiveness
and productivity of its workforce. The base architecture of the model is formed by 2 employee stocks:
inexperienced (Rookie) employees and Experienced employees. The Inexperienced employee stock
increases as new hires are incorporated into the organization as dictated by the growth rate in table 6, and
decreases as inexperienced employees which have yet not become experienced employees, quit the job
per the inexperienced quit fraction. On the other hand, the experienced employees stock is fed by
inexperienced employees that have acquired knowledge (automatically and at no cost) through exposure
to systems, products, services, process and tools ; and have migrated from an inexperienced status to an
experienced status. In this case the assimilation time is constant at 104 week. A decrease in the
Experienced employees stock is caused by the attrition rate of experienced employees given by the
inexperienced quit fraction due to multiple reasons not relevant for this analysis, therefore as mentioned
before this attrition rate is constant.
This model includes three important variables that define the capacity of the organization to execute as a
response to an increase in services demand. The first one is The Rookie Fraction which indicates the
portion of inexperienced employees out of the total amount of employees in the organization. The second
variable is the Average Productivity defined by the expected productivity of inexperienced employees
plus the expected productivity of experienced employees. The third variable is the Effective Workforce
defined as the amount of effective experienced employees plus the amount of effective inexperienced
employees.
Figure 7: Rookie factor learning curve model, provides a pictorial description of the model. This model
has been modified from the original created by Oliva and Sterman. For further description of the model
refer to the work of Oliva and Sterman (2010).
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iii. Results
The simulation of this model using the assumptions defined above generates the results detailed in the
subsequent pages. Please note that some of the figures below are expressed in "Dmnl" units defined as:
Dmnl = dimensionless units where 1 equals 100% and 0 equals 0%.
Expected Headcount of PD Organization in Mexico (2011 CY - 2015CY)
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Figure 8: Expected Headcount of PD Organization in Mexico (201 1CY - 2015CY)
The graph above is a close-enough illustration of what the PDOM would expect in terms of headcount
growth from the beginning of 201 ICY to the end of 2015CY, where the organization would grow from
approximately 550 employees to about 1013 according to the assumptions described before. The total
headcount is defined as the sum of inexperienced employees plus experienced employees. Throughout the
5 years, the approximate ratio of experienced employees to inexperienced employees is maintained at
approximately 2 to 1. Note that the number of inexperienced employees grows from year one to year three
in almost constant rate. As expected, when hires are frozen (per the assumptions "zero" headcount growth
planned in 2014CY), the amount of inexperienced employees decreases from approximately 345 to 262
inexperienced. If this is true, year 2014CY would signify an acceleration of the level of expertise in the
organization mainly due to a freeze in the hiring process.
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Figure 9: Expected Rookie fraction of the PD Organization in Mexico (2011CY - 2015CY)
As mentioned before, one of the most important indicator of the organizations capability to respond to
growing services' demand is the Rookie Fraction variable which specifies the portion of inexperienced
employees out of the total amount of employees in a given week. Figure 9 interestingly shows that the
rookie fraction is kept constant at around 36% for 156 weeks or 3 years, from the beginning of 2011 CY
and until the end of 2013 CY. This plateau effect of the rookie fraction between 2001 CY and 2013 CY is
given by the fact that the rookie fraction is a function of the inexperienced employees and the total
employees. Since both variables growth in equal proportions, then the fraction is unaffected. What this
tells us is that the conversion rate from inexperienced to experienced employees defined as the
"assimilation rate" is not boosted or accelerated along the learning process. This is true since in the model,
the assimilation time is kept constant at 104 weeks keeping the assimilation rate constant as well.
In response to a headcount growth rate reduction in years 2014 CY and 2015 CY, the amount of
inexperienced employees starts decreasing at a constant rate after the week 157 and until the week 208.
This model suggests that by the end of the 5 year period, the percentage of inexperienced employees in
the organization would only have decreased to approximately 26%, significantly short of the target (10%).
It is important to mention that if the organizations growth rate was kept constant, then the rookie fraction
would also be constant for the full duration of the study.
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As expected, these results demonstrate that a linear growth of knowledge and skill or what we assumed as
Automatic learning (see model assumptions) is not enough to achieve the percentage targets for
experienced and inexperienced employees by the end of the 5 years (90% experienced and 10%
inexperienced). This suggests that in order to achieve those targets, a policy focused on achieving
exponential growth of knowledge and skills (learning) will have to be implemented to boost or accelerate
capacity during the execution phase.
Average Productivity
Average Productivity
Figure 10: Expected Average Productivity of the PD Organization in Mexico (2011CY - 2015CY)
Another key indicator of the organization's capacity to execute according to service demand growth is the
Average Productivity defined by the expected productivity of inexperienced employees plus the
expected productivity of experienced employees at a given week. Consist with the rookie factor results
the average productivity of the organization is kept constant at approximately 58% (of the potential
productivity) from 201 ICY to 2013CY while the organizations growth rate is kept unchanged. After the
week 156, the average productivity increases at a constant rate for one year until it decreases the rate at
which the organization becomes more productive to end at an average productivity of 64% approximately.
Note that the jump in productivity is due to the decrease in the rookie fraction (Figure 9) as a result of the
de-acceleration of the organization's growth and not due to the implementation of a learning booster
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policy. These results also confirm that such a policy is required to achieve the targets for experienced and
inexperienced employees (90% experienced and 10% inexperienced).
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Figure 11: Expected Effective Workforce of the PD Organization in Mexico (2011CY - 2015CY)
In a high-speed growing product development organization, one would expect to see an exponential
growth of the Effective Workforce. This workforce is defined as the amount of effective experienced
employees plus the amount of effective inexperienced employees. As defined in the assumptions, an
experienced employee is only 80% effective and an inexperienced is only 20% effective, therefore the
effective workforce of an organization will be composed primarily of experienced employees. The curve
in Figure 11 shows the growth of the effective workforce in the organization from 2011 CY to 2015 CY
and the tendency is far from being exponential as would have expected. As opposed, the effective
workforce is showing a growth trend close to linear which suggests that the status quo in the learning
process is not being challenged.
iv. Model Conclusions
There is not too much to add, but we can say that by definition, we want a low cost/high value
organization that produces more with less or as I technically define, an organization with the highest
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possible average productivity levels. The results of this model suggest that a policy should be
implemented in the organization to enable capacity acquisition through learning. Low cost/high value can
be achieved by implementing a learning booster policy driven by mentoring and "learning by doing"
training but, it has its consequences addressed in the next section.
2.1.2) Mentoring and in-job-training to Acquire Capacity (booster policy)
According to Oliva and Sterman (2010), there are multiple ways to increase the productive capacity of an
organization. The first obvious strategy is to expedite the hiring process of employees with high initial
capabilities like effectiveness and efficiency amongst others. The PDOM has understood the importance
of getting the best people available and Chapter one provides a quick guide (suggestions) of the overall
attributes and skills that the new employees should have.
The second strategy is to "increase the responsiveness of service capacity by accelerating the learning
process (Oliva and Sterman, 2010)." Given the latter, they conclude in their studies that there are two
parameters that determine the speed and strength of the learning curve in an organization:
" "Rookie productivity fraction: The productivity of inexperienced employees relative to fully
trained employees.
" Assimilation time: How long it takes inexperienced employees to become fully experienced".
The relevant question in this case is how can the two parameters above be achieved? Tyre and von Hippel
(1993) have studied the dynamics of the adaptive learning process and learning by doing in complex
organizations. According to them, "adaptive leaning is situated in that it depends on experts' ability to
utilize resources and to gather information that is embedded in particular physical settings. Thus, to
understand and resolve problems, experts need to make use of the practices, occurrences, beliefs, and
artifacts available in specific, concrete settings (Tyre, and von Hippel, 1993)." On that same token, they
define Learning by doing as a simple "form of problem-solving that involves application of a production
process (or product, service or technique) in its intended use environment. Learning by doing involves
users or others who are actively problem-solving to change the environment in order to create
unanticipated problems for products or processes or services that operate within it (Tyre, and von Hippel,
1993)." A common example of adaptive learning by doing is the use of rapid prototyping in the auto
industry. These techniques enable the organization to create robust products/services by creating
unanticipated problems through changing the environment in which they perform. This is what the
essence of learning by doing is and by implementing it, significant costs are avoided and assumptions are
rapidly transformed into knowledge increasing the capabilities of the organization.
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The basic discussion extracted from the arguments above is that the adaptive learning process of the
PDOM should not fight against the benefits of Learning by doing or in-job training schemes to leverage
the continuous learning process of the organization. Learning by doing has demonstrated to have
significant effects on reducing cost of production as well as contributed to increasing the capabilities of an
organization. A great example of a mentoring policy intended to become an in-job-training or learning by
doing policy adopted by the PDOM is the "team leader program" implemented in 2011 CY. This program
was a simple mentoring scheme where a fully experienced and capable employee was assigned to train 2
to 4 relatively inexperienced employees. Team leaders not only kept their own engineering
responsibilities but acquired the roll of mentor, which in most cases increased their work significantly.
So why did this program fail? The following section develops an argument in favor of a booster policy
called mentoring and in-job-training (learning by doing) as key to increase the speed and strength of
the learning curve in the organization and also illustrate one of the effects of the mentoring process on the
overall productivity of the organization in early years of implementation. The implementation of this
policy in the Product Development organization is seeking to increase the productivity of inexperienced
and reduce the time it takes them to become experienced as suggested by Oliva and Sterman.
v. Case Scenario
The Model conditions and parameters are the same as in the previous example case except that now the
booster policy called Mentoring and in-job-training (Learning-by-Doing) has been implemented. The
effect of the booster policy has been added in the model structure illustrated in Figure 14: Rookie factor
learning curve model with Booster Policy. This model assumes that the policy impacts directly the rookie
productivity fraction and the assimilation time and negatively affects the productivity of the experienced
employees since they need to dedicate some of their time to train the inexperienced employees. In order to
maintain the model simple, we assume that the effectiveness of the training policy in the organization is
reflected in a linear improvement where the overall rookie productivity fraction and the time it takes to
assimilate experience in the organizations behave as follows:
a. Linear improvement of the Rookie Productivity fraction from 20% to 50% approximately.
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Figure 12: Rookie Productivity Fraction (Mentoring and Training Policy)
b. Linear improvement of the Assimilation time from 104 to 78 weeks approximately.
Assimilation Time
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Figure 13: Assimilation time (Mentoring and Training Policy)
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c. Linear improvement of the Fraction of experienced employee's time required for mentoring from
0.2 to 0.1 approximately over the 0.8 of original productivity.
Fraction of experienced time required for training
0.3
0.225
5 0.15
0.075
0
0 26 52 78 104 130 156 182 208 234 260
Time (Week)
Mentoring and Training Policy
Figure 13A: Fraction of experienced time required for training (Mentoring and Training Policy)
Figure 14: Rookie factor learning curve model provides a pictorial description of the model. This model
has been modified from the original created by Oliva and Sterman. For further description of the model
refer to the work of Oliva and Sterman (2010).
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vi. Results
The simulation of this model using the assumptions defined above and the Mentoring and Training policy
generates the results detailed in the subsequent pages. Please note that some of the figures below are
expressed in "Dmnl" units defined as:
Dmnl = dimensionless units where I equals 100% and 0 equals 0%
Rookie Fraction (Mentoring and Training)
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Figure 15: Expected Rookie fraction of the PD Organization in Mexico with Mentoring and
Training Policy (2011CY - 2015CY)
Figure 15 provides a comparison between the behavior of the rookie fraction with and without the booster
policy. As expected, with the policy in place, the Rookie Fraction decreased at a faster rate compared to
the non-policy model as a result of boosted assimilation time and rookie productivity fraction. The rookie
fraction starts at around 36% and decreases down to 34% at week 156 weeks or 3 years. In the previous
example, the rookie fraction was kept constant during the same period. By the end of the 5th years, the
rookie fraction went down to 22% compared to 26% previously obtained with no policy. Although these
results are still shy from the target of 10% rookie fraction by year 2015, they indicate an improvement in
the learning curve of the organization therefore the conclusion is that this is the right way to proceed in
order to boost the capacity of the organization to address demand growth for services. Is this fast
enough? Figure 16 might indicate that it is not.
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Figure 16: Average Productivity of the PD Organization in Mexico with Mentoring and Training
Policy (2011CY - 2015CY)
As figure 16 illustrates, at the beginning of 2011 CY the Average Productivity with the mentoring and
training policy in place is about 15 points lower than the average productivity without this policy and it
remains lower for about 197 weeks (3.8 years). This is explained by the fact that mentoring and training
requires experienced employees to dedicate some of their productive time to train inexperienced
employees therefore reducing the "experienced employees' productivity fraction" which in the baseline
example was assumed at 80%.
However, we can see that the speed at which the average productivity increases is faster with the policy in
place compared to the non-policy model. By the end of the 5th years, the average productivity of the
organization is 5% higher with this policy compared to the non-policy example. Unfortunately, in this
particular theoretical case, this capacity acquiring rate might not be fast enough to address the increasing
demand for engineering services during the first 4 year. Assuming that the PDOM is not affected by
extraordinary events like massive head cuts, natural disasters, and is not affected by increasing attrition
rates, focusing on increasing the rookie productivity fraction and reducing the assimilation time will
indeed boost the average productivity of the organization in the long run but the organizations should
expect a reduction in the performance during the first stages of the policy implementation.
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Figure 17: Expected Effective Workforce of the PD Organization in Mexico with Mentoring and
Training Policy (2011CY - 2015CY)
Although the average productivity of the organization is lower than the baseline example during the first
3.8 years approximately (197 weeks), as expected, with the mentoring and training policy in place, the
effective workforce grows at a faster rate, therefore by the end of the 5th year the effective workforce
grows to about 863 out of 1013 employees (Figure 17). This means a 21% increase compared to the
baseline example at the end of the period. During the first 3 years the growth of the effective workforce
follows an exponential pattern as expected in a high-speed learning organization, but this growth de-
accelerates due to the hiring freeze projected in year 2013 CY. If the hiring rate was maintained constant
up to the end of 2015CY, this exponential growth would have been maintained.
vii. Model Conclusions
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, organizations facing growing service demands struggle to
acquire capacity fast enough to satisfy that demand. This lack of capacity is translated into non desired
levels of average productivity. Assuming that the PDOM is not affected by extraordinary events like
massive head cuts, natural disasters, and increased attrition rates, a simple policy composed of mentoring
and on-the-job training can provide the necessary boost to increase productivity by improving two things:
The rookie productivity fraction and the assimilation time. By definition, the improvement of the
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average productivity will increase the effectiveness of the organization yielding a faster execution
response. Also a higher average productivity will result in improved efficiency therefore lower cost and
higher quality. But this policy might not yield results fast enough to respond to demand since, as seen in
figure 16, the productivity of the organization tends to decrease during the initial stages of the
implementation of the policy. This argument reinforces the fact that in order to acquire capacity fast
enough it is therefore critical to hire the best people possible to improve even further the rookie
productivity fraction and reduce the assimilation time.
The results of the boosted model speak by themselves. The following table provides a comparison of the
key variables between the two models:
Table 7: Model comparison results
Inexperienced Productivity Effective Workforce
Employees Fraction (employees)
Beginning End Beginning End Beginning End
Baseline model (no 0.36 0.27 58% 64% 318 648
policy)
Mentoring and 0.36 0.22 43% 69% 318 863
Training policy model I
Finally these results support the argument that in order to respond to a rapid increase in services demand a
booster policy such as the mentoring and training policy can be implemented to help meet that demand by
accelerating the learning process; but since inexperienced typically learn with the help and mentoring of
experienced employees and on-the-job training, this is not free from negative effects (Oliva and Sterman,
2010). "Mentoring lowers average productivity and reduces the time experienced personnel can allocate
to their own work as they supervise inexperienced, demonstrate proper procedure and answer their
questions. In the case where mentoring is implementing, the effective workforce is thus determined by the
effective number of experienced employees, which is the number of experienced workers net of the time
they devote to mentoring. The effect of mentoring on average productivity is proportional to the number
of inexperienced that need to be trained. Thus, it can have a dramatic impact in situations where the
rookie fraction is high, when the organization is growing rapidly (Oliva and Sterman, 2010)."
This effect illustrates one of the multiple reasons why an organization cannot support the implementation
of mentoring and training schemes such as the "team leader program" implemented by the PDOM. A
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reduction in productivity may not be acceptable for the organization therefore making such programs
ineffective during the first months or years. The key to making these programs effective is by reducing
the effect of mentoring on the "fraction of experienced employees time required for training". To improve
the effectiveness of this program, what could have been done differently in terms of time spent mentoring
inexperienced employees?
* Implement real in-job-training policies rather than shadowing policy:
Considering again the importance of planning when architecting a system; it is therefore important to plan
what the roles and responsibilities of an inexperienced employee would be since day one of his
assignment. The concept of shadowing implies a full time experienced employee being followed all the
time by an inexperienced employee. At the time the shadowing starts, the only responsibility of the
inexperienced employee is basically to imitate what the experienced employee is doing but without
having a real assignment or responsibility, in other words, the inexperienced employee is limited to
learning from others with very little real implementation of what has been learned. The immediate effect
is the reduction of the average productivity of the experienced employee down to 55% approximately at
the beginning of the policy and slowly ramping up to 75% according to this model (vs. an assumed 80%
in the previous model). If otherwise, the inexperienced had an incremental responsibility in a program, the
inexperienced could start learning by himself through in-job-training rather than shadowing; and he could
only use the experienced employee's help when needed. This could definitely impact in a positive way
the "fraction of experienced employees time required for training"
2.2) Investing in "ilities"
Efficiency and Effectiveness enhanced by mentoring and training is not enough to avoid shortfalls during
the execution phases. Organizations are required to identify, understand and embrace Change to become
sustainable. More important, as suggested by Aguirre (2008) and Miles (2010), organizations are in need
to maintain flexibility, agility and adaptability to respond to variability (change) during execution, as a
key element to increase efficiency and effectiveness (low cost / High value).
As mentioned in the beginning of chapter two, everyday organizations around the world fail to address
demand since they face the challenge to produce more with less. Organizations that fail to respond
efficiently and effectively to increasing levels of demand as a result of constant change usually suffer
from burn-out as a consequence of fatigue (see chapter three for more information). "These are the
realities of the PD Organization in Mexico, an environment of change and great uncertainty. The ability
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of this organization to adapt to changing circumstances, yet be efficient at the tasks it must do a thousand
times, is a balance that is challenging to achieve. Flexibility of the product development system's
capabilities is therefore crucial to surviving in today's product development environment (Aguirre
2008)." With this increasingly challenging environment in which the But this policy might not yield
results fast enough to respond to demand since, as seen in figure 16, the productivity of an organization
tends to decrease during the initial stages of the implementation of the policy.
2.2.1) Defining Flexibility, Agility and Adaptability
The following argument extracted from DeNeufville and Scholtes provides a simple but useful illustration
of how variability is inherent in any process:
"Unfortunately, it is impossible to predict exactly what the future will bring over the long term,
and over the life of systems. Experience demonstrates, again and again, that specific forecasts
turn out to be far removed from what actually happens. Exceptionally, we might be able to look
back after 10 or 20 years and see that our long-term forecast was accurate, but few of us are ever
so lucky (DeNeufville and Scholtes, 2010)."
By definition, there is inherent variability in all processes. All execution related activities assume a degree
of uncertainty that is not supported by reality. Volatility is part of the ecosystem in which the organization
operates (Trevor Miles, Embrace the Uncertainty). With these arguments in mind, successful
organizations have developed emerging attributes that characterize its execution such as Flexibility,
agility and adaptability.
One of the most important attributes of the Product Development organization is Flexibility which refers
to the ability to make changes in the product being developed or in the process by which it is developed,
even relatively late in the development, without being too disruptive (Smith, 2008). Aguirre (2008) in his
thesis maintains that "Flexibility in product development allows a firm to tackle a diversity of engineering
problems and drives engineers to engage in problem solving." He argues that "the flexible organization
will move seamlessly from one problem to another and use the available resources in creative ways to
solve problems. The ability to do this can help reduce the cost of engineering and stabilize work load."
Second, Agility refers to the ability that organizations develop to respond quickly to sudden changes in
supply or demand in order to handle unexpected disruptions smoothly and cost efficiently (Miles, 2010).
It is the ability of a system to be both flexible and undergo change rapidly. (ESD terms and definitions,
2001)
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Third, Adaptability or adaptive capacity is the ability of the organizations to evolve over time as
uncertainty reshapes variables such as economic progress, political shifts, demographic trends and
technological advances (Miles, 2010). It is the ability of a system to change internally to fit changes in its
environment. A flexible system is usually modified from outside the system while an adaptable system
may undergo self-modification (ESD terms and definitions, 2001). Organizations have adaptive capacity
when learning takes place at a rate faster than the rate of change in the conditions that require dismantling
old routines and creating new ones (Staber and Sydow, 2002).
2.2.2) Embrace Change to Develop Emerging "ilities"
How to maintain flexibility, agility and adaptability to be able to solve issues today effectively and
efficiently, in a constantly changing environment? These attributes can be achieved by paying special
attention to the desired type of organization that would execute the daily tasks. As concluded in chapter
one, in a young organization focused principally to manage interfaces and connections, a lightweight
approach is desired to avoid the silo effect by enabling continuous communication between the team
therefore increased flexibility. Besides this, experts conclude that in order to maintain desired levels of
flexibility, agility and adaptability, the PDOM should keep a mindset and cultural behavior opened to
embrace change and the following can serve as a guide (Smith, 2008):
Product/Service - oriented:
" Monitor customers continually: Do not assume that requirements are frozen. Customer trends,
wants and needs are dynamic and change constantly.
* Address change in the design: Implement modular and platform-based designs to isolate change
and maintain flexibility. De-couple designs to increase the ability to incorporate changes without
major effects to the overall system. Handle interfaces between components, sub-systems and parts
with special care.
" Try things out: Take full advantage of rapid prototyping tools such as CAE, breadboards and SLA
mock ups. Example: In order to transform assumptions into knowledge, the CCSE organization
(and others) is required to provide performance data of every vehicle program at the first
prototype milestone. This initial performance is obtained with SLA and rapid prototyping parts.
" Explore the Design Space: Define the initial feasible space and proceed to impose constraints
related to manufacturability, cost, weight or physics.
* Make decisions at the last responsible moment: It is usually hard for managers to understand this
concept since they pay employees to take decisions and reduce uncertainty with facts and data,
not to delay them. Usually we tend to make decisions soon in order to delete pending items from
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our list but in doing this we reduce the opportunity to transform assumptions into knowledge with
time. Example: Rapid prototyping is a useful tool to transform assumptions into knowledge in a
relatively short amount of time. In a recent vehicle program, rapid prototyping and CAE allowed
us to perform as many design iterations as possible to obtain the optimal results of the demister
performance of the vehicle a few days before the design freeze milestone.
" Constantly consider risk and embrace uncertainty. The "flaw of averages" refers to the concept
that it is not correct to calculate the average value of a project based on its performance under
average conditions. "A focus on an "average" or most probable situation inevitably implies the
neglect of the extreme conditions, the real risks and opportunities associated with a project,
therefore, a design based on average possibilities inherently neglects to build in any insurance
against the possible losses in value, and fails to enable the possibility of taking advantage of good
situations (DeNeufville and Scholtes, 2010)."
* Do not fear to fail: A senior manager in the Product Development organization I work for
continuously encourages teams to not to be afraid to fail, instead he encourages teams to fail but
always learn from it. Obviously this is one of the most difficult things to achieve since many
managers judge their employees performance based on the degree of success and target
accomplishments.
2.3) Hypothesis Conclusion
Based on the information generated in this chapter it is valid to state that, when extraordinary events like
natural disasters, major cuts in the workforce and other circumstances do not affect the normal course of
the organization, mentoring and training employees and investing on "ilities" are key enablers to
achieve a low cost execution responsiveness and quality with an inexperienced organization, but it is
important to say that this will most likely not be achieved in the short run. As concluded before, by
definition, the improvement of the average productivity of a workforce will increase its effectiveness as a
result of a faster execution response and will also result in improved efficiency therefore less cost and
higher quality; but in order to see an improvement in the average productivity and therefore effectiveness
and efficiency, "time as a variable" should be added to the equation and unfortunately this delay might
create negative effects on the productivity of the organization in the short term. The answers generated
below provide a deeper insight to justify these arguments.
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What are the most common reasons why young organizations fail to respond to increasing
demand?
As suggested by subject matter experts, the Rookie factor effect and the increasing pressure to do more
with less are common factors that prevent inexperience organization to respond appropriately to
constantly growing demand for services.
What is the effect of the inexperience organization during the execution phase on achieving
success?
The effect of an inexperienced organization (Rookie factor) negatively impacts the ability of the
organization to promptly respond to increasing demand for engineering services. This lack of capacity
derives in a low average productivity of the workforce.
What is the effect of the "pressure to do more with less" during the execution phase on achieving
success?
The pressure to do more with less can reduce effectiveness and efficiency during the execution phase
since it creates the bum-out effect in the organization. As the pressure builds on the organization, the
employee satisfaction can diminish.
How are the "rookie factor" and the "pressure to do more with less" overcome?
Several enablers have been exposed in this chapter as countermeasures to mitigate the effects of the
rookie factor effect on the productivity of the organization and the continuous pressure to do more with
less focused towards supporting the action plans defined by the organization. The table below presents a
summarized of the enablers presented in this chapter.
Table 8: Execution enablers affecting strategic objectives
Goal Enablers
Hire the best people possible to reduce the
time it takes to see positive results of a
mentoring and training policy.
BIC Execution
responsiveness, quality Implement a booster policy to mentor and
and cost train new hires while performing the job (in-
job training). This will improve productivity
and reduce uncertainty when facing
challenges in the long run.
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Enhance employee satisfaction by reducing
stress and burnout.
Invest on developing "ilities" in the
organization to do more with less increasing
efficiency and effectiveness and embrace
change (flexibility, agility and adaptive
capacity).
As a consequence of improved efficiency and
effectiveness, responsiveness, quality and
costs are enhanced.
In order to increase capacity and address demand growth for services, it is not enough to hire the best
people and provide them with the necessary tools and infrastructure. Organizations should pay special
attention to boost the average productivity by implementing mentoring policies that enhance the rookie
productivity fraction and their assimilation time; however mentoring can have a dramatic impact in
situations where the rookie fraction is high and when the organization is growing rapidly since it lowers
average productivity and reduces the time experienced personnel can allocate to their own work as they
supervise inexperienced, demonstrate proper procedure and answer their questions (Oliva and Sterman,
2010). Furthermore mentoring is not free and it is not always possible or always effective for the
following reasons:
" Mentoring lowers average productivity and reduces the time experienced personnel can
allocate to their own work as they supervise inexperienced, demonstrate proper procedure and
answer their questions.
* People can be mentored and trained, they could be provided with the best tools and methods
to work and can be exposed to the best training available. If the people are not adequate,
process discipline will never be fomented because they will show apathy against "on the job
training" and "learning by doing".
Learning by doing and in-job-training enables the organization to create robust products/services by
creating unanticipated problems through changing the environment in which they perform. By doing so,
significant costs are avoided and assumptions are rapidly transformed into knowledge increasing the
capabilities of the organization. For obvious reasons, learning by doing then contributes to reducing
execution/operation costs. A key enabler for learning by doing and in-job-training policies is reducing the
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effect of mentoring over the time required by experts to mentor inexperienced. This can be done by
replacing the shadowing programs with in-job-training programs.
What are some of the "ilities" necessary to sustain the organization in a constantly changing
environment?
As defined in this chapter:
* Flexibility: the ability to make changes in the product being developed or in the process by
which it is developed, even relatively late in the development, without being too disruptive
* Agility: the ability of a system to be both flexible and undergo change rapidly.
* Adaptability: the ability of a system to change internally to fit changes in its environment.
How to maintain flexibility, agility and adaptability?
1. Given the nature of the young PD organization in Mexico, as concluded in chapter one, a
lightweight approach is desired to avoid the silo effect by enabling continuous communication
between the team therefore increased flexibility.
2. Mindset and cultural behavior opened to embrace change
o Monitor customers continually
o Address change in the design
o Try things out
o Explore the Design Space
o Build strong teams
o Make decisions at the last responsible moment
o Constantly consider risk and embrace uncertainty
o Do not fear to fail
Finally, the development of this chapter suggests that organizations usually are risk averse and do not
know how to execute under a constant changing environment. Usually High-speed growing organizations
facing increasing services demand confront a series of fundamental contradictions that disturb the pace
and rhythm of learning and executing. Some of the contradictions that this chapter encountered are:
* Do more with less
* Solve issues now but delay decisions as much as possible to reduce uncertainty
* Delay decisions today to gather facts and reduce the assumption to knowledge ratio
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" Pressure to do work today at a faster rate will increase the time spent working but decrease the
actual performance of the organization in the long run.
" Fix problems before they happened and never get credit for it
* Achieve perfection by embracing failure
Although the information and results gathered here were not focused to provide explanations and solution
to how this contradictions should be managed, it is important to keep in mind that managers (experienced
and inexperienced) will most likely find them during the execution phases of the organization.
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Chapter 3: Improving
Hypothesis - Increasing learning capabilities is key to achieve BIC responsiveness and
quality while maintaining low costs.
Figure 18: Execution Enablers
Successful organizations are those that learn from experience. The planning and execution phases should
be driven by the application of lessons learned obtained from previous experiences. New failure modes
identified in recent projects are expected to be included in the design of an organization during the
planning, execution and improving phases. Given the latter, the following relevant questions are raised to
guide the discussion in this chapter.
0 Why organizations fail to learn (improve)?
* What is the best way to overcome the vicious cycle of suppressing learning?
* What are the organization's learning capabilities that improve the execution responsiveness and
quality?
* What are the learning capabilities that other high velocity organizations develop to achieve
success?
This chapter is focused on developing arguments around the importance of facilitating the learning
process in an organization in order to improve their overall operation and execution. The intention is to
provide an illustrative case to prove that closing the learning cycle is necessary to improve execution
performance and also to demonstrate how complicated it can be to enhance a learning mindset in an
organization due to vicious cycles present in the daily operation and execution of the organization. A
system dynamic model is again applied as the method to generate information to answer these supporting
questions stated above.
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3.1) The Vicious Cycle of Suppressing Learning
First, in order to illustrate the dynamics of learning in an organization, two opposing but complementing
theoretical cases are developed in this chapter as a method to provide illustrative results supporting the
argument of facilitating learning in an organization and to demonstrate how and why organizations fail to
enhance it.
Let us assume that the PDOM has recently acquired the responsibility to design, validate, release, and
launch a new Top-Hat product within the next two years (see definition of Top-hat products in section
1.3.1 of Chapter one) . As part of the overall goals of the organization, the team is required to execute
with the highest levels of responsiveness and quality at the lowest cost, therefore this demand for
engineering services sets the bar for the first variable called desired performance.
Immediately after the organization acquires the responsibility to design the Top-Hat, emerging
capabilities arise. These capabilities are defined as "the measure of the ability of an entity to achieve its
objectives, especially in relation to its overall mission" (business dictionary). These capabilities are
inherent to the organization's inputs defined in chapter one (goals, products, services, processes, people
and tools) and are defined as a stock, which means that the level of a given capability can be increased or
decreased with time by investing or eroding them.
With the desired Performance set and the demand for engineering service established, the next
immediate step the organization takes is to start executing (working) in order to close the gap between the
actual performance and the desired performance. High velocity organizations such as the PDOM are
expected to learn fast and at exponential rates therefore, as the rhythm of the project picks up, the
organization is exposed to increasing levels of pressure to do work in a more efficient way each time;
this means less room for variability and mistakes. Time spent working on the project increases as a
result of higher pressures over the teams and the immediate results (short term) usually suggest an
improvement of the performance of the organization (responsiveness and quality). However this pressure
builds up in the organization creating a burn-out effect in the long run.
With apparently increased levels of performance as a result of continuous pressure to do the work, the gap
between the current performance and the desired performance is lessened. When the gap between actual
and desired performance is reduces, an inverse effect happens; the pressure to do work is reduces, the
amount of time spent working decreases and the performance of the organization diminishes. This
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complete balancing cycle is defined by Repenning and Sterman (2001) as the Work harder loop
illustrated in the model in Figure 19: The Work Harder Loop.
Desired
Per UM 
Ba 
eOalw= 
+
E - -Capability 2 - '
Insbnen in E&%Ximnof
Capability , M* lif H. PrMSSUr Wo do workt
+ + 0WodcHard
+ (do mor witk less)
Time spait
Delay Burn-out + worldg +
Time spat on
Figure 19: The Work Harder Loop (Adapted from Repenning and Sterman, 2001)
3.1.1) Real Life Example: Demister Duct Design
In a recent automotive project, the team that I worked for suffered the effects of the work harder loop
described in the previous paragraphs and illustrated in Figure 19, creating unnecessary extra work,
therefore lethargic execution and cost. We were 6 weeks away from the deadline to delivering the final
design of the demister ducts. These ducts are present in practically every car and are used to direct hot air
to the side windows in order to defrost them. Increased pressure to deliver the design without further
delays to the deadline forced the team to erratically create 12 different designs one after the other with the
help of rapid prototyping and CAE tools (learning by doing). Per data obtained from the global CCSE
organization, usually 7 design iterations are required to come up with an optimal design.
Each design proposal required an average of 1 week to be frozen in the CAD repository system and
subjected to CAE simulation to assess the defrosting performance under certain conditions; therefore
approximately 12 weeks were needed to come to an optimal design, in other words, a milestone
completed 6 weeks after the deadline. Each time a design iteration was completed the management team
was satisfied, but as soon as the CAE results came back, the sad news pushed them to impress more
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pressure over the team to deliver. The design was not enough to meet the climate control performance
targets.
As a consequence of compressed timing and continuous pressure to deliver the design without further
delays, we obviously never had time to present the evolution of the 12 design proposals in any of the
designs review forums available to receive feedback from experts and engineers that already design
similar parts. We focused only on reporting the failed results of each design proposal with little or no
feedback from the experts; just more pressure to deliver. Neither did we perform a deep dive review of
the available failure mode avoidance documents. What happened in this case was that the team was
divided in two: on one hand the designers of the duct and on the other, the experts of the climate control
performance. Due to a lack of communication between both bands as a result of little time to do so, the
team never took a conscious moment to analyze the performance results as a team and determine what
was going wrong with the design; neither took time to learn from the flaws of the design. As opposed, the
two silos under a great deal of pressure kept iterating with very little incremental improvements and
feedback about the design.
After 9 weeks of infructuous work, when the team realized that very little progress had been made, a
change in the dynamic of the team was implemented. Passed the 1 Oth iteration, we stopped to focus on
building, analyzing and implementing knowledge. . Other teams facing similar design challenges were
able to generate a vast pool of knowledge about similar designs and found which critical features should
be included in the design. So we analyze all the results consciously and digested the lessons learned
previously generated. In doing so, we broke the rhythm of the design iteration, this time it took us 3
weeks instead of 1 week to come up with the solution but the results were positive. With a conscious
design frozen, we proceeded to obtain the last blessing from the management after 12 weeks of work.
A graphical illustration of the work harder effect suffered by this team can be analyzed with the data
obtained by Repenning and Sterman (2001) in figures 20, 21 and 22. This data yields somehow intuitive
and predictable result but helpful enough to illustrate in a simple way how the work harder loop works
and why it is undesirable when it becomes a standard in the execution of an organization.
With the deadline to deliver the design just around the corner, the management team starts building
enormous amount of pressure pushing the team to work towards closing the gap and deliver the duct
design. In response to that, the team steps on the gas pedal to dedicate more time to complete tasks
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increasing the levels of effort impressed to perform the work (Figure 21). This sudden reaction creates a
spike in the performance of the team which in this case is translated in 12 misleading, useless design
iterations (Figure 20). Very few times a team is able to turn around that many iterations with one week
between each one, but useless after all.
Misleading signals in the development of a project, can lead managers to think that the positive trend in
the performance could be maintained by applying continuous pressure over their employees without
recognizing the needs to invest on capabilities in order to increase the ability to achieve its objectives. In
the duct design example, after some time, the actual performance of the team starts to show signs of
erosion due to the effect of burned-out as a result of continuous pressure to do more with less (Figure 20).
Very little incremental progress is done and a huge amount of resources and time are consumed to create
demister duct design proposals without success.
As the model in figure 19 suggests, when the performance diminishes, meaning multiple design proposals
not achieving the desired performance, the gap between the desired performance and the actual
performance is increased; therefore the management tries to compensate the loss by further increasing the
pressure over the levels of effort impressed in the tasks creating a growing burn-out and exhaustion effect
(figure 22). At this point, the team commences to erode its capabilities by losing key talent, reducing
employee satisfaction, suppressing learning, enhancing cutting-corners and promoting firefighting among
other consequences.
The following figures are adapted from Repenning and Sterman (2001)
Actual Performance (Work Harder loop)
a.
Time
Figure 20: Actual Performance (Work Harder loop). Modified from Repenning and Sterman (2001)
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Figure 21: Effort (Work Harder loop). Modified from Repenning and Sterman (2001)
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Figure 22: Capability (Work Harder loop). Modified from Repenning and Sterman (2001)
Unfortunately, the PDOM like many others has the potential risk to fall under the Work Harder Loop
and adopt it as the standard operating procedure as opposed to recurring to it only when the variability
inherent to the planning and execution phases demand for problems to be solved now. Based on this
argument it is important to keep in mind some of the multiple reasons that can lead the PDOM to fall into
this trap. The following is a compilation of ideas extracted from experience and data obtained from
literature:
* Failure to allocate the right resources during the planning phase of a project brings problems
during the execution. Insufficient or incorrect resources derive in poor quality, low
responsiveness, and high costs of execution due to lack of effectiveness and efficiency as a result
of firefighting and cutting-corner (Black and Repenning, 2001).
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" Lack of leadership to spread a learning behavior culture. As mentioned in chapter one, managers
tend to put pressure over their employees to execute now therefore suppressing the process of
generating and documenting learning (Smith, 2008).
" Managers blaming people for their failure rather than blaming the system where the employees
execute push their organizations to fall into this trap (Repenning and Sterman, 2001).
" Continuous pressure to deliver on time increases the stress levels of the organization enhancing
employees to cut corners during the execution. This brings poor quality, low responsiveness, lack
of effectiveness and efficiency and high costs (Oliva and Sterman, 2010).
" High levels of stress burns employees out diminishing the employee satisfaction levels
(Repenning and Sterman, 2001). Employees not satisfied enough to owe the outcome of their
work tend to avoid going further therefore suppressing the process of documenting learning under
the argument of "Why should I document learning if I don't care for the future of the
organization?"
" A common mistake organizations make is designing an incentives program erroneously focused
on rewarding firefighting instead of rewarding problem avoidance. As organizations grow more
dependent on firefighting and working harder to solve problems caused by low process capability,
they reward and promote those who, through heroic efforts, manage to solve troubled projects or
keep the line running (Repenning and Sterman, 200 1).
" Some cultures are overwhelmed with work since they do not know how to say no to increasing
demand for services. The PDOM will have to learn to reject new projects consciously to allow the
system to learn.
The key element to understand the effect of the work harder loop is given by the fact that the organization
in this example does not dedicate any time to improve or invest on its capabilities. The organization is
forced to deliver the work by applying a continuous pressure over it, increasing the effort to perform and
diminishing the overall quality of the execution.
3.2) The Virtuous Cycle of Building Learning Capabilities
3.2.1) Real Life Example: Demister Duct Design. What can be done differently?
An opposite vision of the vicious cycle of suppressing learning is the dynamic model of building
capabilities through the learning process. A counterpart of the example presented in section 3.1 is used to
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demonstrate the importance of building knowledge. In this case it is also assumed that the PDOM has
acquired the responsibility to design, validate, release, and launch a new Top-Hat product within the next
two years at the highest levels of execution responsiveness and quality at the lowest cost, setting the bar
for the desired performance. With the desired Performance and the demand for engineering service
established, the immediate step is to start executing (working) in order to close the gap between the
actual performance and the desired performance.
As the rhythm of the project picks up now the organization has two choices: increase the levels of
pressure to do work in a more efficiently way each time or to increase the pressure to improve
capability. In this case the organization decides to increase the pressure to improve capabilities by
launching improvement programs, encouraging people to experiment with new ideas and approaches, and
investing in training as suggested in chapter two. As a result the organization focuses its efforts to
increase capabilities by rising the time spent on improving. Finally, as capabilities grow, the actual
performance of the organization improves significantly closing the existing gap between it and the desired
performance. This complete balancing cycle is defined by Repenning and Sterman (200 1) as the Work
Smarter loop illustrated in the following model.
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Figure 23: Work Smarter Loop (Adapted from Repenning and Sterman, 2001)
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Using the data obtain by Repenning and Stermand (2001) we can see that, as opposed to the work harder
loop curves, the work smarter loop yields much more promising information to contribute with the long
run success of the organization. The moment the organization wisely chooses to put some pressure to
improve its capabilities rather than pressuring to do work, the long lead timing to implement actions to
improve capabilities and the resources designated to do so create a negative effect in the performance of
the organization (Figure 24). As concluded in chapter two, mentoring and training create a negative effect
on the organization's productivity in the short term which can also explain the effect of figure 24. This
scary effect is what most not successful organizations tend to avoid for many reasons like:
* Critical financial conditions not allowing them to afford loses in the short term
" Uncertainty in regards to how low the performance will plumb and questions related to whether
the organization will be able to overcome this decrease in performance
" Avoid continuous questioning from the key stakeholders of the organization in regards to
negative results. Stakeholders expect improvements not otherwise.
" Management lacking of a long term vision.
The effect of dedicating more time to build capabilities pays off by becoming time spent on creating value
to the organization (Figure 25). Slowly capabilities start to increase by reverting the negative trend of the
actual performance of the organization therefore increasing the measure of the ability of the organization
to achieve its objectives. In the long run, the performance of the organization increases above the level
that emerged initially (Figure 26).
The following figures are adapted from Repenning and Sterman (2001)
Actual Performance (Work Smarter Loop)
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Figure 24: Actual Performance (Work Smarter loop). Modified from Repenning and Sterman
(2001)
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Figure 25: Effort (Work Smarter loop). Modified from Repenning and Sterman (2001)
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Figure 26: Capability (Work Smarter loop). Modified from Repenning and Sterman (2001)
However, the idea of having only "work smarter loops" in an organization is simply unrealistic. As
mentioned in chapter one, there is just so much information available that an organization can use to plan
accordingly and confirm assumptions, but there is always information that simply does not exist and
therefore, as in any complex system, unpredictable issues will rise inevitably and solutions will have to be
implemented "now" with the highest levels of urgency. So ideally, both the work harder and the work
smarter loops have to coexist and should complement each other. The nature of the work harder loop
allows organizations to obtain benefits faster (short term) as suggested in the results presented in section
3.1 of this chapter. When the work harder loop is implemented usually organizations can obtain a sudden
spike in its performance; in other words, the work harder loop helps to address urgent problems by
enabling the organizations to find solutions to problems that need to be addressed right now. On the other
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hand, the process of improving capabilities by working smarter is usually slower and the benefits are
obtained long after the implementation of improvement programs (long term). Furthermore, the greater
the complexity of the improvement process, the longer it takes to improve (Repenning and Sterman,
2001). This phenomenon is represented as a delay between the time spent to improve and the actual
improvement of a given capability. The question now is what are those capabilities that help High-speed
organizations to implement both loops successfully? See next section for answers.
3.3) Beat the Vicious Cycle of Suppressing Learning
Certainly, there is no exact recipe to overcome the challenges that the vicious cycle of suppressing
learning imposes over an organization; however, Spear (2009) suggests that high-velocity organizations
succeed by investing vastly in developing capabilities. A representative example of a high velocity
organization is Toyota. This company has successfully created a culture of self-learning, self -improving
and self-regulating based on the capabilities described in the next section.
3.3.1) Capabilities of High-Velocity Organizations
What are the organization's capabilities that contribute to overcome the vicious cycle of suppressing
learning and improve execution responsiveness and quality?
Capability 1: Use existing knowledge to solve problems as they occur:
"High-velocity organizations invest everything they know so far in designing the desired outcomes of
their execution to maximize the likelihood of success. They specify the most effective approach currently
known for achieving success at a specific task and build the capacity to detect failure when and where it
occurs into the approach to solve problems (Spear, 2009 )." High-velocity organizations like Toyota use
the hierarchical level framework defined in chapter one to enhance quick problem solving as they occur.
These organizations never assume learning is complete. With their increasingly pool of knowledge they
use this framework to define:
* System Outcomes: What does the system have to deliver, to whom and by when? Based on what
has been learned before, define realistic, achievable and specific outputs of the system.
Knowledge gained previously is used to reduce ambiguity around assumptions. Lessons learned
are incorporated to define new failure modes that could potentially disturb the accomplishment of
the desired outcomes.
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" Pathways: What and how is the flow of material, information and communication? Process
improvement is key in High-velocity organization. These organizations spend most of their time
improving processes based on gained experience and knowledge. Significant and continuous
changes are focused on improving the flow of material, information and services based on new
failure modes identified and documented in previous experiences.
" Connections: What are the links of adjacent process steps and between the different areas
involved? High-Velocity organizations use their time wisely to understand and improve the
interfaces involved in each of their processes and within their stakeholders. These organizations
have paid special attention to execute as lightweight organizations (see section 1.3.1 in chapter
one).
* Methods: How people do the work for which they are responsible? High-Velocity organizations
are participative in a way that they care about how their people do their work and how they can
improve their performance.
Capability 2: Build knowledge through problem solving:
High velocity organizations use their time mostly to prevent problems from happening. Ideally very little
time should be spent to solve problems, but this is unrealistic. High velocity organizations by definition
innovate, and innovation itself is about discovering during implementation. Given this, problems are
always part of the natural dynamics of complex high velocity organization.
High-Velocity organizations never stop learning as a result of the innovation implementation cycle. As
expected during the definition of the system outputs, they create new knowledge by solving problems as
they occur (learning by doing). "High-Velocity organizations are adept at detecting problems in their
systems at the time and place of their occurrence. Also they contain those problems before they have a
chance to spread diagnosing and treating their causes so the problem cannot reoccur (Spear, 2009)." High
velocity organizations like Ford Motor Company have developed problem solving disciplines that have
spread across the organization. This discipline can be summarized as follows (adapted from the
OneFord):
* Identify the current failure modes as they occur
* Perform initial diagnosis of failure
" Implement interim containment actions to contain the problem temporarily
" Perform deep root cause analysis
" Implement permanent corrective action
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* Document lessons learned
* Spread learning
One key parameter for successful implementation of this framework is time. Successful organizations are
those that can react fast to problem solving.
Capability 3: Share the knowledge with the rest of the organization:
According to Steven Spear in his book The High Velocity Edge (2009), one characteristic of Low-
performing organizations is that they make matters worse by suppressing their ability to learn from
experience. When something goes wrong during the execution phase and trivial events that apparently
would not have an immediate consequences appear, people discover how to contain them using a variety
of creative workarounds and firefighting techniques. Usually the problem goes away but the factors that
caused it remain in place to cause reoccurrence. Eventually enough little things occur in just the right
combination to cause a disaster (Spear, 2009).
"High-Velocity organizations multiply the power of their new knowledge by making it available, not only
to those who discover it but also throughout the organization. They share solutions and process of
discovery" (Spear, 2009). "Organizational learning is the ultimate goal of the lean product development
team that understands that leadership in engineering is a matter of dynamic renovation and evolution
(Aguirre, 2008)."
Capability 4: Lead by developing:
High velocity organizations are participative in the sense that these organizations incentivize their
employees to actively participate in the problem-solving process and process improvement discipline. As
mentioned before, Toyota is the perfect example of a culture where each employee has the responsibility
to generate knowledge through problem solving, in other words, the organization encourages its
employees to lead their own improvement. Furthermore, such high-velocity organizations work towards
diffusing a culture focused on understanding, enhancing and implementing the virtuous cycle of
capabilities illustrated in Figure 26.
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Figure 27: Virtuous cycle of learning capabilities
According to this cycle, the first step successful organizations implement to approach success is to use
existing knowledge in the planning, execution and improving phases extracted and documented from
previous experiences. Once knowledge has been used to transform assumptions into facts, successful
organizations build new knowledge through learning by doing and problem solving (see chapter one).
New knowledge generated is finally spread throughout the whole organizations creating and increasing
capabilities.
3.3.2) Real Life Example: Demister Duct Design Conclusions of Suppressing
Learning
There are multiple success and failure stories that illustrate the application of the virtuous cycle of
learning capabilities. The demister duct example presented in section 3.1.1 of this chapter, is a useful
representation of a situation where beside lack of communication, suppressing learning led a team to find
undesired levels of performance, execution quality and ultimately unnecessary costs.
When the team realized that very little progress had been made in the design of the ducts, a change in the
dynamic of the team was implemented and the team finally came up with the optimal design solution
through building, understanding and implementing learning. All this unnecessary extra work could have
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been prevented and the arguments below summarize what could change in the organization to enhance
learning
* the organization should truthfully focused its efforts on leading by enhancing learning sharing
within it. The effort dedicated in the organization to incentivize knowledge, documenting and
spreading it is yet not enough to guarantee long run success
" the process of using knowledge, building new one and spreading it in the organization should be
documented properly and available for everyone. The organization failed to close the virtuous
cycle of capabilities because the process is not clear.
3.4) Hypothesis Conclusion
Although we can conclude that focusing on increasing the learning capabilities of an organization
improve its performance by enhancing execution quality and responsiveness, we should highlight
that learning is a slow process, usually painful and complex since the results of such policies are
perceived in the long run as suggested by the work smarter loop. The work smarter loop example
illustrates how learning indeed enables the organization to increase capabilities in the long term by
investing in learning, therefore improving the measurement of the ability of the organization to achieve its
strategic objectives and the ultimate goal. But as the work harder loop suggests, fast responsiveness can
also be achieved in the short term by applying pressure to do the work, only on those tasks that need to be
solved now. It is important to establish that this fast responsiveness does not necessarily imply an
improvement in quality neither a degradation of it at least not until the burn-out effects over the
organizations leads to poor execution. Once burn-out affects the organization then we can imply low
quality and increased costs.
Based on the definition of success stated by the PDOM, there is a potential risk of falling under the
vicious cycle of the work harder loop due to the continuous pressure to do more with less and to reach the
ultimate goal of becoming the BIC organization in terms of responsiveness, quality and cost. This
continuous pressure can drive the organization to break the virtuous cycle of learning capabilities by
avoiding documenting and spreading new knowledge. Therefore the organization will have to put extra
emphasis on operating under both the work harder and the work smarter loops. Work harder loop allows
organizations to obtain benefits faster in the short term and should be used to contain problems with
urgency, while with the work smarter loop the process of improving capabilities is usually slower and the
benefits are obtained long after the implementation of improvement programs.
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Unfortunately slow-velocity organizations are commonly trapped in the work harder loop and fail to
execute under the work smarter loop (learning) due to different cultural and technical reasons exposed
next (not limited to):
" Failure to allocate the right resources in a project
" Lack of leadership to spread a learning behavior culture.
" Managers blaming people for their failure rather than blaming the system
" Continuous pressure to deliver on time
* High levels of stress
" Incentives programs focused on rewarding firefighting instead of rewarding problem avoidance.
* Other inherent cultural aspects
In the effort to explain the effect of learning over the performance of an organization several relevant
questions and answers emerged:
What is the common trap organizations fall under preventing them to improve?
Organizations tend to suppress learning by falling under the work harder loop. Failure happens when the
work harder loops becomes the operating standard of the organization therefore suppressing learning.
What is the best way to overcome the vicious cycle of suppressing learning?
There is no exact recipe to achieve it. It requires special leadership skills and people attributes to diffuse a
new culture in the organization. However, the following recommendations extracted from literature and
the results of this chapter can serve as a starting point to achieve success:
- Giving credit to those who work hard to solve problems but privilege those that use the work
smarter loop as the standard to build capabilities and prevent recurrence of problems.
- Keeping in mind that a problem is not over when it is solved but when the organization learns
from it. Always make some time to allow employees, teams and organizations to learn. Lead by
developing your organization's capabilities. Investing on developing and spreading knowledge
across the organization to build new capabilities. See example of demister duct design described
in previous pages of chapter three.
- Being inclusive by leveraging the knowledge and expertise of your employees to improve
processes. High velocity organizations mostly on what the current employees can offer in terms
of process improvements. The most common example is Toyota.
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What are the organization's capabilities that contribute to improved execution responsiveness and
quality?
The virtuous cycle of learning capabilities is composed of:
o Use existing knowledge to solve problems as they occur
o Build knowledge through problem solving
o Share the knowledge with the rest of the organization
o Lead by developing
As mentioned above, the effects are perceived in the long run.
How these capabilities contribute to achieving the strategic plans of the organization?
Table 9 provides a summary of the enablers presented in this chapter.
Table 9: Enablers affecting the Strategic Objectives
goal
BIC Execution
responsiveness, quality
and cost
Enablers
Use the work harder loop to contain
problems now, not as the standard operation
of the organization. Simultaneously push
your organization to increase capabilities in
the long run by spreading new knowledge
driven by the work smarter loop.
Apply pressure to increase knowledge. Push
people to learn and to restlessly increase
wisdom. Incentivize the work smarter loop to
foster excellence.
Create a culture around the Virtuous Cycle of
Capabilities to: Use existing knowledge,
build new knowledge, spread knowledge and
lead by developing your organizations'
capabilities.
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Chapter 4: Framework Summary and Thesis Insights
4.1) Framework Summary
The development of this thesis provided an insight on multiple lessons learned about how to plan, execute
and improve a relatively inexperienced organization. I would be contradicting the conclusions generated
in chapter three if I did not share the knowledge generated from the development of each hypothesis. So
let us think about Chuco Perez again. Now that he has been promoted in the PDOM, he is eager to
cooperate with the sustainability of the organization; therefore he is willing to apply any suggestions into
building his own micro organization, so the following highlights have been compiled to provide a
guideline and framework for him:
First, although dedicating enough time to architecting (planning) the inputs of an organization and its
links might enhance high levels of execution responsiveness and quality at reduced costs, the data that
would let organizations to be more certain about their future simple might not exist yet. The real
challenge is to determine the amount of time that should be allocated in order to transform the maximum
possible amount of assumptions from not proven to proven; but at the same time making sure that the
time allocated for planning is used efficiently. Based on the information generated in Chapter one, this is
what I suggest Chucho should consider during the planning phase of his micro organization:
How to plan?
* Identify the essential inputs of your own product development system: Goals, Service, Product,
Process, People and Tools.
* Apply a method such as the decomposition framework used in chapter one as a useful tool to
design each input at the following levels: System, Architecture, Interfaces/connections and
Components.
* Use that same method to clearly identify the links and connections between and within your
organization's inputs.
* Identify which people you want in your team by hiring people that:
- Owns the outcome
- Demonstrates full engagement and commitment
- Builds confidence in others
- Capable of understanding the tasks to be performed
* Has a loud voice to be heard
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* With the people's characteristics identified, plan the organization's architecture that can enhance
a lightweight execution to enable continuous communication between the team and avoid the silo
effect.
Second, organizations should pay special attention to boost its average productivity in the short and long
terms by hiring the best people and by implementing mentoring policies respectively, in order to increase
the rookie productivity fraction and the rookie assimilation time; however mentoring can have a dramatic
impact in situations where the rookie fraction is high since it lowers average productivity and reduces the
time experienced personnel can allocate to their own work.
Usually High-speed growing organizations confront a series of fundamental contradictions that disturb the
pace and rhythm of learning and executing. It is important to keep in mind that managers (experienced
and inexperienced) will most likely find those during the execution phases of the organization. Some of
the contradictions that this analysis encountered are:
" Do more with less
" Solve issues now but delay decisions as much as possible to reduce uncertainty
* Delay decisions today to gather facts and reduce the assumption to knowledge ratio
* Pressure to do work today at a faster rate will increase the time spent working but decrease the
actual performance of the organization in the long run.
* Fix problems before they happened and never get credit for it
" Achieve perfection by embracing failure
Based on the information gathered in Chapter two, this is what I propose Chucho should consider during
the execution phase of his own inexperienced organization:
How to execute?
* Overcome the rookie factor and the pressure to do more with less:
- Boost the average productivity by implementing mentoring policies that enhance the rookie
productivity fraction and their assimilation time.
- Understand that mentoring lowers the average productivity and reduces the time experienced
personnel can allocate to their own work as they supervise inexperienced, demonstrate proper
procedure and answer their questions.
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- Learning by doing and in-job-training enable the organization to create robust
products/services by creating unanticipated problems through changing the environment in
which they perform. Also they can help to reduce the negative effect on the time required by
experienced employees to mentor inexperienced.
- Implement mentoring policies that do not adversely affect the time experts need to allocate to
train inexperienced. In this regard I propose to replace "shadowing policies" with in-job-
training policies.
" Invest on "ilities" like flexibility, agility and adaptability through a lightweight team approach.
This will allow avoiding the silo effect by enabling continuous communication between the team.
* Diffuse a mindset and cultural behavior opened to embrace change by:
- Monitoring customers continually
- Addressing change in the design
- Trying things out
- Exploring the Design Space
- Building strong teams
- Making decisions at the last responsible moment
- Constantly considering risk and embrace uncertainty
- Not fearing to fail
Third, there is no exact recipe to instill a learning culture in organizations. It requires people with certain
leadership skills and attributes to diffuse new values. Successful implementations of policies that help
organization to improve its performance include both a top-down schemes or work harder loops that
yields results in the short term and bottom-up schemes or work smarter loops with long term visions to
develop capabilities.
Ideally both loops should coexist in high-velocity organizations. Work harder loops should be
implemented as a method to solve issues now. On the other hand, work harder loops should be
implemented as the leading culture of the company to improve constantly. The implementation of work
smarter loops become difficult since there is a natural delay between the moment these policies are
implemented and the moment they yield solid results, however this is what I propose Chucho should
consider during the improving phase of his organization:
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How to improve?
* The following recommendations can serve as a starting point to overcome the vicious cycle of
suppressing learning:
- Focus your efforts on enhancing the virtuous cycle of learning capabilities:
o Use existing knowledge to solve problems as they occur
o Build knowledge through problem solving
o Share the knowledge with the rest of the organization
o Lead by developing
- Giving credit to those who work hard to solve problems but privilege those that use the work
smarter loop as the standard to build capabilities and prevent recurrence of problems.
- Problems are not over when solved but when the organization learns from it.
- Be inclusive by leveraging the knowledge and expertise of your employees to improve
processes.
Finally, table 10 below provides a summary of how the strategic objectives defined in the first pages of
this thesis can be enabled during the planning, execution and improving phases of the PDOM.
Table 10: Summary table of enablers affecting the strategic objectives
Organizational Strategicgazs Phase objectives / Action Enablers
goals Plans
Define the basic inputs of the product development
organizations (goals, products, services, processes,
people and tools)
Low cost / high Define the peoples' DNA
value operations Define the team type that should execute according to
BIC Execution the design level required.
responsiveness, Planning Provide people with the necessary tools and
quality and cost infrastructure
Define the peoples' DNA
People Excellence Provide people with the necessary tools and
infrastructure
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Execution
Controls
(Improving)
Process Discipline
Low cost / high
value operations
People Excellence
Process Discipline
Low cost / high
value operations
People Excellence
Process Discipline
Define robust, clear and simple processes to achieve
desired goals based on the products and services that will
become the outcome of the organization
Define the team type that should execute according to
the design level required
Invest on developing "ilities" in the organization to do
more with less increasing efficiency and effectiveness
and embrace change (flexibility, agility and adaptive
capacity)
Properly implement a booster policy to mentor and train
new hires while performing the job (in-job training).
This will reduce uncertainty when facing challenges.
Enhance employee satisfaction by reducing stress and
burnout.
Diffuse a process-centered culture through a mentoring
and training culture. Reduce stress and burnout to
achieve process discipline
Use the work harder loop to contain problems, not as the
standard operation of the organization. Push your
organization to increase capabilities by spreading new
knowledge.
Apply pressure to increase knowledge. Push people to
learn and to restlessly increase wisdom. Incentivize the
work smarter loop to foster excellence.
Create a culture around the Virtuous Cycle of
Capabilities as: Use existing knowledge, build new
knowledge, spread knowledge and lead by developing
your organizations' capabilities.
4.2) Thesis Insights
During the development of this thesis I faced several challenges. The following paragraphs are focused on
providing insight on those challenges and suggested next steps.
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I
As opposed to what I thought, obtaining qualitative data turned out to be as complicated and ambiguous
as to obtain quantitative data. The first issue was to interpret and understand the answers provided from
key interviewees. Sometimes interviewers tend to extract from interviews only the information that is
consistent to its prejudices and ideals, and tend to disregard information that is opposite to his
preconceived concepts. This happened to me when trying to extract the general ideas from the interviews
and meeting I had with stakeholders.
Second, the hypotheses formulated in this thesis have multiple answers that depend on the context in
which the system under investigation is applied. Given this, it turned complicated to generate objective
data and evidence to confirm, or reject the hypotheses. However I understood that in order to generate the
data to support the conclusions of each hypothesis it is important to define the system and the ecosystem
of the entity under evaluation, and also the implications of cultural difference between the organizations
of a company. I learned that cultural differences do affect the performance of an organization but most
important I learned that cultural differences will need to be considered serious as part of the dynamics of
any future study. Somehow researchers will have to define a quantitative variable to illustrate the effect of
cultural aspects in dynamic modeling.
Third, the results generated in chapter two helped me to understand the effect of mentoring and training
over a complex organization dedicated to build cars. These products require long lead design
development, a complex supplier network, heavy duty equipment to build them and teams composed of
hundreds of people. The question is how different the analysis provided in chapter two would be if it was
applied to an organization with shorter design lead time development, smaller or null supplier base, and
teams composed of fewer people like a software development company? I believe researchers should
focus their efforts on differentiating the amount of time required to improve the inexperienced
productivity fraction and the assimilation time in both types of organizations, to determine if mentoring
and training policies have the same "scary" effect at the initial stages of implementation or not, in either
organization. The same question could be applied to those organizations which principal product is an
intangible service.
Finally, this thesis should serve as the basis of future works focused on improving the performance of the
PDOM and therefore various next steps should be considered as part of this work:
* Further studies should be performed to understand how a lightweight structure should be
architected in the PDOM. Badin, Beristain and Zamora (2012) have proposed the creation of a
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"knowledge-System" architecture organization focused on integrating multiple functions into
systems rather than PMT's (see definition of PMTS in the list of acronyms). The basic idea
extracted from its work is illustrated in figure 28 below. What they propose is to migrate from a
functional organization divided in 5 PMT's: Powertrain, Body Interior, Body Exterior, Chassis
and Electrical; to an organization based on systems: Door, Instrument Panel, seats/carpet/floor,
fascia/lamps/grille. This way, integration of components could be enhanced by creating a focus
on designing components interfaces.
PMT focus Functional Systems focus
B
Figure 28: Proposed Knowledge-System Architecture
" The organization's architecture proposed in figure 5: CCSE "To-Be" organization architecture
decomposition is focused on creating a lightweight approach. The next step should evaluate its
benefits once implemented.
* Further studies should be conducted to determine how long would it take for a mentoring policy
implemented in the PDOM, to improve the average productivity of the organization.
" It would be interesting to study the impact of a re-defined "team leader" program considering a
focus on in-job-training rather than shadowing. Then compare this data with the one obtained
from the failed version of the "team leader" program.
* It would also be of great interest to somehow document the virtuous cycle of capabilities as a
formal process in the PDOM. As a next step it would be important to study how often the
organization in his early stages closes the complete cycle. I am convinced that success will not be
achieved if this cycle is kept unclosed.
* Finally, it would be important to document the real impact of the framework provided in this
thesis on the accomplishment of success in the PDOM.
With this insight I declare this thesis complete.
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Appendix A: Relevant Questions for Hypothesis Development
These questions were generates as a result of my own curiosity, experience and passion about the research
topic and enriched from general thoughts extracted from the PDOM SDM meetings.
Planning:
* What are the basic inputs of the Product Development System?
* How these inputs should be designed (planed) to maximize chances of success?
* What characteristics should the employees of the organization have to execute the action plans?
* Based on the incoming responsibilities acquired by the PDOM, what type of organization should
execute the plans?
Execution:
" What are the common reasons why young organizations fail to respond to increasing demand for
services?
* What is the effect of the inexperience organization during the execution phase on achieving
success?
* What is the effect of the "pressure to do more with less" during the execution phase on achieving
success?
* How are the "rookie factor" and the "pressure to do more with less" overcome?
* What are some of the "ilities" necessary to sustain the organization in a constantly changing
environment?
Improving:
* Why organizations fail to learn (improve)?
" What is the best way to overcome the vicious cycle of suppressing learning?
* What are the organization's learning capabilities that improve the execution responsiveness and
quality?
* What are the learning capabilities that other high velocity organizations develop to achieve
success?
91
Appendix B: Why CCSE failed during its early stages?
The following compilation of ideas was obtained through a series of short interviews with key
stakeholders of the organization and personal experience. The relevant question in this case was open-
ended with the intention to capture as much insight as possible:
Why CCSE failed during its early stages?
General answers:
Lack of motivation
Lack of objectives definition
No Cohesiveness within the team due to unrelated activities
Redundancy in the work performed by core engineering and STA
Little or no interaction with parent organization in US
Coaching and mentoring was sporadic and inconsistent
The overall satisfaction of the organization in the US had decreased. Morale was low due to the
industry conditions.
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Appendix C: PDOM SDS Meeting general ideas
The PDOM SDM meeting is a forum designed to discuss strategic, technical and organizational topics
with the PDOM management team and all the alums and alumni that have been part of the MIT Systems
Design and Management program. One of the main topics of the meeting is to discuss the future of the
PDOM and how SDM alums and alumni can contribute actively to guarantee success; therefore multiple
questions related to the sustainability of the organization are raised in search for answers. The high level
ideas extracted from these meetings that inspired the development of this thesis were condenser and
documented as follows:
What is the importance of hiring the best people in the PDOM to achieve success?
What is the impact of tolerating uncertainty in the daily execution of the organization?
What is the impact of a relatively inexperienced organization in its own productivity?
How can change be adopted and embraced to become tolerant to variability?
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